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THE SANDY CHILD AND FAMILY HEALTH 
BRIEFING REPORT SERIES
This report is part of the 2015 Briefing Report Series of the Sandy Child and Family Health (S-CAFH) 
Study.   Reports in the series describe the impact of Hurricane Sandy on several key aspects of New Jersey 
resident’s lives.   Four briefing reports will be provided by the team that cover the following topics:  (1) The 
Place Report – the decisions and actions related to evacuation, housing, community, and restoration and 
repair; (2) The Person Report - the physical and mental health status and well-being of residents who lived 
in areas exposed to Hurricane Sandy, with an additional focus on children’s health; (3) The Problems Report 
- residents’ current unmet needs and their experience with systems of formal help; and (4) The Progress 
Report - the factors associated with stalled or facilitated recovery among affected residents.   
Each report will follow a similar format, opening with a brief summary of the existing knowledge, a descrip-
tion of the study and the methods used to collect the data, key findings including figures and graphs that 
may assist readers in interpreting the data, a summary with policy and programmatic implications, and 
an appendix of detailed tables of the study results.   Across all of these reports we employ a common 
approach for analyzing the data.   We have constructed “presentation” categories so that we can represent 
the experiences of different groupings of New Jersey residents.   We have categorized the residents in the 
S-CAFH Study by individual characteristics – such as age, gender, race/ethnicity – and by household-level 
characteristics – including the state region where they live, the amount of damage their home sustained, the 
presence or absence of children living in the household, and their annual household income.   The series will 
conclude with a summary report detailing the main findings from the four substantive briefing documents.   
See Figure 1 for a summary of the core content in each of the briefing reports in the series.
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THE PLACE REPORT: SANDY CHILD AND FAMILY HEALTH (S-CAFH) STUDY I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Hurricane Sandy was one of the largest storms on record, sweeping through the eastern seaboard of the 
United States with a massive diameter twice the size of Hurricane Katrina.   Although wind speeds did not 
match those of Katrina, the combination of high tide at landfall and the lunar phase resulted in exceptionally 
high storm surges.   
Catastrophic storms such as Hurricane Sandy can have devastating effects on many aspects of human life 
and the environment, undermining economic activity, crippling critical infrastructure, and disrupting hun-
dreds of thousands of lives for weeks, months, or even years.  The Sandy Child and Family Health (S-CAFH) 
Study was designed to describe and analyze the impacts of the storm on the residents of New Jersey, identi-
fying those needs which emerged and those which are still pressing.   The research team – a partnership of 
faculty and research staff from Rutgers University, New York University, Columbia University, and Colorado 
State University – randomly selected and surveyed 1,000 residents of New Jersey’s “Disaster Footprint,” 
representing the experiences of 1 million New Jersey residents living in or near those coastal areas of the 
state most directly exposed to the storm. 
The primary focus of this Briefing Report, the first in a series of four thematic reports, is to document the 
storm’s impact on PLACE in New Jersey residents’ lives, with a particular emphasis on Sandy’s effect on 
people’s homes and housing decisions.  Among the key findings of the report are the following:
 Decision-making: In the hours and days before the storm’s landfall, public officials made repeated efforts 
to persuade New Jersey residents living in vulnerable areas to evacuate.  Approximately 24% of the 
residents living in the most highly-exposed areas of the nine affected counties, or about 240,000 people, 
were under a mandatory evacuation order.  Over one-third of those residents complied with the manda-
tory evacuation order.  South Jersey residents were twice as likely to evacuate as were North Jersey 
residents.1  Those in the south were more likely to believe their home was unsafe in the face of the storm, 
more likely to have had prior hurricane experience, and more likely to have a place to go to. 
 Implications:  More targeted risk communication and warning messages are needed.  Public officials 
should consider testing and vetting messages using community engagement strategies, with a 
particular emphasis on “market segmentation” approaches and specific attention to messaging for 
vulnerable populations;
 Destruction and Disruption: Approximately 110,000 residents in the nine hardest-hit counties were living 
in homes that suffered major structural damage or were destroyed, and an additional 90,000 people were 
living in homes that sustained enough damage to make them uninhabitable for a short period of time.  
There were substantial corollary impacts even among those residents whose homes were characterized 
as structurally undamaged– 31% reported wind damage, 18% reported flood damage, and 11% reported 
mold damage.  Eighty-eight percent of people lost power and between about half and three-quarters lost 
hot water and heat because of Sandy. 
 Implications:  Long-term recovery metrics that measure the progress of repair and restoration of 
damaged housing are needed since this represents a central aspect of individual and community 
recovery.  These recovery metrics should be able to distinguish progress within each category of 
FEMA-defined housing damage: destroyed, major, minor, affected, or none;
1  North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Union Counties; South: Atlantic, Cape May, Monmouth, Ocean Counties.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (CONT’D)
 Housing help needed and sought: New Jersey residents’ housing needs are complex and cumulative.  
Approximately one-quarter of residents living in the Disaster Footprint, about 240,000 individuals, needed 
practical assistance in clearing debris, repairing and restoring homes, and elevating their homes to protect 
them from future storms.  Sixteen percent of New Jersey residents expressed a need for financial help 
in paying rent, mortgage, or utilities, about half of whom also had expressed a need for practical repair 
services.  For housing-related needs such as debris clearing or replacing furnishings, between 40-50% of 
residents with a need applied for assistance; for elevating, restoring, or repairing a home, approximately 
80% applied for assistance.  Still, despite many residents applying for aid, only 25% of residents in the 
Disaster Footprint had heard of the state’s Sandy Homeowner and Renter Assistance Program (SHRAP), a 
widely-available and accessible program that offered up to $15,000 in financial assistance.  Among those 
who had heard of SHRAP, only one in five had applied for assistance, although among those whose homes 
suffered major structural damage, nearly two-thirds applied for help.
 Implications:  Public officials should develop targeted communication strategies that are based on lists 
or registries of owners and renters of damaged housing.  Housing damage is a risk factor for financial 
stress and for health-related stress as well (as described in the PERSON Briefing Report).  Messages 
can focus upon available programs and services with clear eligibility criteria;
 Vulnerability: As with so many historic disasters, there was a sharp income gradient associated with both 
post-storm need and with help asked for and received.  Those with the least amount of income reported 
the greatest housing needs, while those with the greatest household income were generally more likely 
to apply for assistance.  This “poverty penalty” seemed reasonably consistent: in addition to starting out 
with less stability in their lives, in that those in the lowest income bracket were far less likely to be married 
or partnered, far less likely to have achieved higher or advanced educational degrees, and far less likely to 
be homeowners, this impoverished population was much more likely to spend all or most of their savings 
or credit on recovery needs.
 Implications:  Financial counseling services should be developed as part of disaster case management, 
in order to help storm victims identify and access all available assistance programs and manage their 
financial assets appropriately.  In addition, officials should consider the development of micro-loan 
programs for storm-affected populations with limited financial means.
Any effort to facilitate good decision-making on the part of New Jersey residents, whether it involves  
evacuation decisions, restoration decisions, or financial decisions, should be predicated on timely and  
targeted messaging.  This Briefing Report provides data on the decisions and actions that residents adopted 
in the face of the impending storm and throughout the recovery period.  This information should help inform 
officials and stakeholders as they develop even more effective communication campaigns.  
Assuring safe and stable housing is one of the most important individual and collective goals after a cata-
strophic disaster.  Individuals and families rely upon homes for shelter, sanctuary, and often as a significant 
economic asset; in turn, communities rely upon a strong housing base as a means of maintaining or 
enhancing political strength and community resilience, as well as serving as linchpins for social and eco-
nomic growth.  While many residents in New Jersey’s Disaster Footprint are making substantial progress in 
rebuilding their homes and communities, there are clearly still pockets of damage and disruption, even two 
and a half years after the storm.   
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Catastrophic storms such as Hurricane Sandy can have devastating effects on 
many aspects of human life and the environment: They can undermine economic 
activity, cripple critical infrastructure and supply lines, displace households and 
businesses for weeks, months, or even years, have lasting physical and mental 
health impacts on those who are exposed to such events, and even alter our rela-
tionship to the physical and social landscapes in which we live.
The Sandy Child and Family Health (S-CAFH) Study 
was designed to describe and analyze the impacts of 
the storm on the residents living in nine of the hardest-
hit counties in New Jersey, identifying those needs 
which emerged and those which are still pressing.   
To accomplish this, a random sample of 1,000 
residents living in or near those coastal areas of the 
state most directly exposed to the storm was drawn 
and surveyed.   This group – a research “cohort” – is 
statistically representative of the 1 million New Jersey 
residents who were living in those geographic areas 
of the state most exposed to the storm, referred to 
throughout this study as Sandy’s Disaster Footprint 
(See Figure 3).  
The primary focus of this Briefing Report, the first in 
a series of four thematic reports, is to document the 
storm’s impact on PLACE in New Jersey residents’ 
lives, with a particular emphasis on Sandy’s effect on 
people’s evacuation behavior, homes, and housing 
restoration decisions.  Among the questions the PLACE 
Report seeks to answer are:
1.  As the storm approached, what decisions did New 
Jersey residents make regarding evacuating or shel-
tering in place, and why?
2.  After the storm passed, what was the magnitude of 
destruction and disruption in people’s lives? 
 
3.  What housing-related help was needed by New 
Jersey residents, and what help was sought?
4.  How do issues related to PLACE, including housing 
and community, impact vulnerable populations and 
hinder recovery? 
This Briefing Report follows the conventional structure 
of a research report.  It begins with an introduction that 
describes the context for the S-CAFH study, follows 
with a brief description of the geographical area under 
investigation, presents some of the key research 
findings, and concludes with a consideration of the 
implications of the findings.  For interested readers, 
there are a number of appendices at the back of this 
report, which present the study methods and data in 
greater detail.
The Storm and its Impacts
To understand the impact of Hurricane Sandy on the 
residents of New Jersey, one needs to begin with the 
storm itself, both in terms of its magnitude and its 
power.  By the time the center of Hurricane Sandy2  
made landfall in the United States near Brigantine in 
Atlantic County, New Jersey, at 7:30 p.m. on October 
29, 2012, the National Weather Service had been broad-
casting dire warnings about the impending storm for 
days.  Forecasters predicted record coastal flooding as 
early as October 25.  
2 When it made landfall in the U.S., Sandy was a post-tropical cyclone.  The media adopted the non-scientific term “Superstorm.” 
Following the lead of other academic and government reports, we adopt the term “Hurricane Sandy” throughout the S-CAFH Briefing 
Reports series.
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On the morning of Sunday, October 28, the National 
Weather Service warned of “major coastal flooding…
possibly to record levels” and high winds of up to 
70 miles per hour that would cause “power outages 
[that] could last at least several days.”  Likewise, the 
National Hurricane Center warned of 6 to 11 feet of 
storm surge along the coasts of New Jersey and New 
York, using the urgent headline “Life-Threatening 
Storm Surge.”3   The region was on high alert that a 
catastrophic storm was bearing down on the Atlantic 
seaboard.
As with most such storms the principal threats were 
from wind and water.   This was exacerbated in the 
case of Sandy, as the hurricane struck at a particularly 
dangerous time: Sandy’s landfall coincided with a 
high-tide cycle that was higher than normal due to 
a full moon.  Meanwhile, the storm’s extremely low 
pressure enhanced wind speeds from the northeast, 
causing water to back up along the coasts, bays, and 
harbors along the eastern seaboard during multiple 
high-tide cycles.  These two effects led to record-setting 
storm surge and wave action that battered the shores 
of Long Island in New York and northern New Jersey.4 
The storm surge flooded the New Jersey coastline 
with water and sand up to 8 feet above ground level in 
some locations, with the worst flooding in Monmouth, 
Ocean, and Middlesex Counties.  In these areas, 
homes were washed off their foundations, boardwalks 
destroyed, and cars and boats carried inland by the 
raging water.5  Flooding did not just endanger coastal 
areas, it pushed water into New York Bay and up the 
Hudson and Raritan Rivers, causing massive flooding 
in Jersey City, Hoboken, and Sayreville.6  Many resi-
dents in these areas had to be rescued by the National 
Guard.  As high winds and water inundated the area, 
the municipal water, sewage, electricity, and gas lines 
came under threat.  By the time the storm was over, 
New Jersey faced roughly $1 billion in damages to 
power and gas lines, $3 billion in damages to waste, 
water, and sewer services, and nearly $6 billion in 
housing damages.8,9 According to insurance claims and 
estimates of lost income, the financial impact of Sandy 
on New Jersey residents totaled $7.8 billion, hitting low 
and moderate income households particularly hard.10     
Hurricane Sandy’s northwest turn into the New Jersey 
coastline was a historically rare event: Since 1870, only 
one other hurricane entered the state without previ-
ously encountering land.11  Sandy was also the second 
largest Atlantic storm on record, with tropical storm 
force winds reaching nearly 1,000 miles in diameter.12  
Its minimum pressure of 945 millibars is the lowest 
recorded pressure for a storm entering the United 
States north of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.   That 
low pressure is significant: While Sandy’s sustained 
wind speed of 80 mph is on the low end of a Category 
1 hurricane, this low-pressure reading is more typical 
of a Category 3 Hurricane.13  
3  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  2013.  “Service Assessment: Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy, 
October 22-29, 2012.” National Weather Service, NOAA.  Silver Spring, MD, U.S.  Department of Commerce.  
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf.  Accessed on March 23, 2015.
4  NOAA, 2013.
5  According to the National Weather Service, the tide gauge at Sandy Hook, NJ reported 8.01 feet above MHHW before it failed during the 
storm.  The tide gauges in Bridgeport and New Haven, CT, reported water levels of 5.82 feet and and 5.54 feet above MHHW.  (NOAA, 2013).
6  Blake, E.  S., T.  B.  Kimberlain, R.  J.  Berg, J.  P.  Cangialosi and J.  L.  Beven II.  2013.  “Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy (AL182012) 
22-29 October 2012.” Miami, FL: National Hurricane Center.  http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf
7  Woolley, Wayne.  2013.  “A Storm–and Response–Unlike any Other.” Guardlife: The Official Magazine of the NJ National Guard 35(4).  
Available at: http://www.state.nj.us/military/publications/guardlife/volume35no4/5.html
8  Blake, et al.  2013.
9  Rutgers School of Public Affairs.  The Impact of Superstorm Sandy On New Jersey Towns and Households.  2013.  
10  NJ Department Of Community Affairs.  Community Block Grant Disaster Recovery Action Plan.  2013.
11  FEMA.  2013.  “Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York: Building Performance Observations, Recommendations, and Technical 
Guidance Mitigation Assessment Team Report.” Washington, DC: FEMA.
12  NOAA, 2013.
13  FEMA, 2013.
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By 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, October 28, New Jersey 
Governor Christie had declared a state of emergency 
and issued a mandatory evacuation order for the 
following areas of the state: Atlantic City, Longport, 
Margate City, Brigantine, Ventnor City, Cape May City, 
Wildwood, North Wildwood, Wildwood Crest, Sea Isle 
City, Ocean City, Stone Harbor, Strathmere, Avalon, 
Lavallette, Mantoloking, Seaside Heights, Seaside 
Park, and all of Long Beach Island.14   That same day, 
Hoboken Mayor Dawn Zimmer and Jersey City Mayor 
Jerramiah Healy ordered the evacuation of all base-
ment and street-level residential units.15,16 
New Jersey is the most densely populated state in 
the U.S.   The types of communities impacted by 
Sandy ranged from seaside towns of vacationers and 
pensioners along the Atlantic Ocean coastline to the 
economically-challenged rural towns on the shore 
of Delaware Bay, to the more populated urban and 
suburban cities of Hoboken, Jersey City, Newark, 
Moonachie, and Little Ferry.17  Such social, economic,
14  New Jersey Executive Order 104.  October 27, 2012.
15  FEMA, 2013.
16  There have been very few reported studies of evacuation compliance prior to S-CAFH.   One survey of 500 residents of the New 
Jersey coast, conducted by the Monmouth University Polling Institute 5 months after the storm, suggests that compliance with 
the evacuation orders was limited.  Among residents living in mandatory evacuation areas, only 49% reported evacuating prior to 
the storm while another 9% left once the storm was underway.   Approximately 33% of coastal New Jersey residents evacuated 
during Sandy, a number comparable to evacuation during Hurricane Irene (30%).    Monmouth University Polling Institute.  2013.  
“Superstorm Sandy Survey: Impact on New Jersey Coastal Residents.” West Long Branch, NJ, Jersey Short Partnership Foundation 
and Urban Coast Institute, Monmouth University.
17  Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force.  2013.  “Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Strong Communities, A Resilient Region.” 
Housing Damage and Individual Assistance
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and geographic diversity meant that the types of 
damage and the needs of each population varied by 
location. 
Most of the damage to residential housing resulted 
from flooding.  Ocean-front buildings were also 
impacted by wave action and shore erosion.   The 
majority of units damaged in coastal areas were older 
1-2 family homes that were constructed prior to the 
community adoption of floodplain regulations and 
had generally not been elevated to the appropriate 
base flood elevation (BFE).  Likewise, the majority of 
residential units in mid- and high-rise buildings dam-
aged during the storm were not elevated to the recom-
mended BFE.  As a result, these buildings were flooded 
and suffered the failure of mechanical, electrical, 
plumbing, and other critical systems.18  
FEMA was in the process of updating the floodplain 
maps, when Sandy hit.  The project to revise the 
outdated maps had been underway for two years prior 
to Sandy.  The new maps, which at the time of this 
report have not formally passed the federal regula-
tory process, are estimated to include an additional 
33,000 New Jersey residences that were not in the 
previous FEMA 100-year floodplain map (roughly 
267,000 residences are included in the updated map).19  
If determined by a floodplain manager to be substan-
tially damaged, these 33,000 homes will be required 
to be elevated in compliance with FEMA BFE program 
regulations, adding to the burden of housing recovery 
and repair costs.
The New Jersey Governor’s office estimates that 
40,500 owner-occupied and 15,600 renter-occupied 
homes sustained severe or major physical damage as 
a consequence of Sandy.20  Another 19,505 owner-occu-
pied and 6,289 rental units sustained minor damage.  
Housing damage has placed a significant burden not 
only on low income and poor New Jersey residents 
but also on moderate income residents.  Roughly 
49% of applicants for FEMA Individual Assistance 
program who reported major or severe damage to 
their homes—approximately 30,000 households—were 
low and moderate income earners.  Meanwhile, 74% 
of renters who applied for assistance were low and 
moderate income households.21  Housing costs in New 
Jersey were already relatively high compared to other 
states prior to Sandy and was especially burdensome 
for low-income and moderate renters.  According to 
HUD 2012 data, 42% of renters in New Jersey use at 
least one-third of their income to pay rent with many 
spending over half their earnings.22   The damage 
caused by Sandy led to a shortage of rental stock and 
increased rents, especially in the hardest hit communi-
ties, increasing the burden of housing costs for low 
and moderate-income residents. 
The North/South Divide
Many residents and demographers characterize New 
Jersey as constituting two major regions, one north 
and one south, which are distinct geographically and 
culturally.23  Although there is no clear boundary, 
residents often demarcate the split between North 
18  FEMA, 2013.
19  New Jersey Department of Community Affairs.  2013.  “Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Action Plan.”  
Trenton, NJ: State of New Jersey.
20  HUD defines “severe” damage as homes FEMA determined to have greater than $28,800 worth of physical damage or more than 
four feet of flooding on the first floor.  Homes sustaining “major” damage have between $8,000 and $28,799 worth of physical 
damage or more than one foot of flooding on the first floor.  Secondary residences, such as vacation homes, are not included in 
these statistics.  (New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, 2013).
21  New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, 2013.
22  New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, 2013.
23  Demographers and residents are divided as to whether there are two regions (north and south) or three regions (north, central, and 
south).   We have adopted the two-region framework to simplify comparisons in this report.
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Jersey and South Jersey as falling at about the point 
where the New Jersey Turnpike intersects the Garden 
State Parkway, somewhat parallel to the tip of Staten 
Island in Raritan Bay.   The designation is a colloquial 
one, reflecting not only geographical but perceived 
cultural differences from the northern part of the state, 
with no official definition. 
New Jersey is sandwiched between the two large 
cities of New  York in the northeast and Philadelphia in 
the southwest; Benjamin Franklin called the state “a 
beer barrel tapped at both ends.”24  Culturally, South 
Jersey is defined as the area in New Jersey within the 
influence of the Philadelphia metropolitan area (also 
known as the Delaware Valley), in contrast to the rest 
of New Jersey, located within the New York metro-
politan area.  In consultation with Rutgers University 
demographers, our research team divided the nine 
most affected counties into northern and southern 
regions.   The north counties include Bergen, Essex, 
Hudson, Middlesex, and Union counties.   The south 
counties include Atlantic, Cape May, Monmouth and 
Ocean counties.   
As illustrated in the map in Appendix A, there are 
clear socio-demographic differences between North 
and South Jersey.   The north is more racially and 
ethnically diverse, with a large Hispanic population, 
whereas the south is over 85% white.   There is also an 
economic divide, in that many of the northern neigh-
borhoods have concentrations of poverty and near-
poverty, something reasonably rare in the southern 
portion of the disaster-affected counties.
The Social Consequences of Disasters 
on Place
Although many aspects of the built environment are 
damaged or destroyed when disaster strikes, the long-
lasting and profound consequences stretch far beyond 
the loss of brick and mortar alone.  Decades of social 
science research has examined how “place” impacts 
individuals and families.25  When people are displaced, 
either temporarily or permanently, they experience 
a shock to their social systems.  It may be weeks, 
months, or years before residents can return to their 
communities following disaster, and many never 
do.   The psychiatrist Mindy Fullilove, in writing about 
displacement from urban housing, refers to this trau-
matic experience as “root shock,” similar to a plant 
being yanked from its native soil and transplanted.  In 
the case of displaced populations, displacement can 
lead to a “reaction to the destruction of all or part of 
one’s emotional ecosystem.”26  It is clear that survivors 
lose more than just their houses in a disaster; they 
lose their homes, neighborhoods, communities, and 
ultimately, for some, their place in the world.  
For many adults and children, the loss of home 
and possessions has a deep impact on emotional 
well-being.27   This, coupled with the stress of finding 
secure housing or repairing damaged homes, can 
increase their risk of negative psychological out-
comes.  Displaced homeowners often move into avail-
able apartments, pushing out renters and low-income 
homeowners.28  Many low-income families search 
24  Fairall, Herbert (1885).  The World’s Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition, New Orleans, 1884-1885.  p.  225.  Google Book 
Search.  Retrieved on June 29, 2015.  “Dr.  Benjamin Franklin once shared the witticism ‘that New Jersey was like a beer barrel 
tapped at both ends, with all the live beer running into Philadelphia and New York.’”  
25  For a review of the literature, see Gieryn, Thomas F.  2000.  “A Space for Place in Sociology” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 463-96.
26  Fullilove, Mindy Thompson.  1996.  “Psychiatric Implications of Displacement: Contributions from the Psychology of Place.” The 
American Journal of Psychiatry 153(12): 1516-1523.
27  Nigg, Joanne M., John Barnshaw, and Manuel R.  Torres.  2006.  “Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New Orleans: Emergent 
Issues in Sheltering and Temporary Housing.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604: 113-128.
28  Norris, Fran Norris, F.  H., Friedman, M.  J., Watson, P.  J., Byrne, C.  M., Diaz, E., Kaniasty, K.  (2002).  60,000 Disaster Victims Speak: 
Part I.  An empirical review of the empirical literature, 1981-2001.  Psychiatry.  65(3).  207-239; Peek, Lori.  “Age.” Social Vulnerability 
to Disasters, 2nd ed., edited by D.  S.  K.  Thomas, B.  D.  Phillips, W.  E.  Lovekamp, and A.  Fothergill, pp.  167-198.  Boca Raton, FL: 
CRC Press.
cont’d




far and wide for places to live, some must leave their 
communities while others become homeless.  Families 
and children often show great strength in the face of 
disaster, but over the long-term, the psychological 
burden of housing loss and instability can take its toll.  
Research shows an increase in domestic violence, 
post-traumatic stress disorders, and other mental 
health issues in communities heavily impacted by 
disasters.29  
Disaster research has also demonstrated that vulner-
able social groups – low-income or poor residents, 
racial or ethnic minorities, women and children, 
persons with disabilities – are more likely to suffer 
from disasters and their aftermath.30  Contributing 
to such vulnerabilities are the physical environment, 
housing characteristics, and community ties of these 
populations.  Vulnerable populations are often more 
susceptible to the lasting impacts of a disaster due 
to damaged or displaced support networks, acces-
sibility issues, or increased costs of living.  Socially 
vulnerable groups tend to have networks made up of 
people with the same or similar social status, power, 
education, and income.   Therefore, as already scarce 
resources are stripped away during a disaster, entire 
communities of people are left with little outside 
emotional and financial support that they can rely on 
to recover.31  In comparison, high-income individuals 
tend to have more diverse networks to draw upon 
in times of need.32  When a disaster strikes, they are 
more likely to have friends or family that live outside 
of the damaged areas, have more resources to draw 
upon for assistance, and have stronger ties to people 
in positions of authority that can influence the disaster 
recovery process.  
The reasons why some people are vulnerable and 
others are not have generated many theories and 
frameworks.   Two of the most common regard social 
vulnerability as either the product of a lack of access to 
resources or capital, or the result of social structures 
and norms that reinforce vulnerability.   Those indi-
viduals and households who cannot access different 
types of resources, whether financial, health-related, 
or social support, among other types of “capital,” are 
fundamentally vulnerable to a variety of stressors.   
This definition of social vulnerability acknowledges 
that many different factors may render different 
groups of people more at risk when disaster strikes, 
because they have the fewest resources available to 
prepare for, respond to, or recover from disaster.  For 
instance, someone living in poverty may be vulnerable 
because he or she cannot obtain the money needed to 
appropriately prepare for a disaster and to evacuate in 
the face of potential harm.   This vulnerability may be 
caused by not having sufficient money to pay for gas 
or a motel when considering evacuating, or not having 
enough financial assets to repair a home when insur-
ance or other housing falls short.   This framework also 
encompasses socially-isolated individuals, regardless 
of socio-economic status, such as some elderly resi-
dents in a community whose lack of access to social 
support resources make them vulnerable to a variety 
of housing harms.  
29  Norris, Fran Norris, F.  H., Friedman, M.  J., Watson, P.  J., Byrne, C.  M., Diaz, E., Kaniasty, K.  (2002).  60,000 Disaster Victims Speak: 
Part I.  An empirical review of the empirical literature, 1981-2001.  Psychiatry.  65(3).  207-239; Peek, Lori.  “Age.” Social Vulnerability 
to Disasters, 2nd ed., edited by D.  S.  K.  Thomas, B.  D.  Phillips, W.  E.  Lovekamp, and A.  Fothergill, pp.  167-198.  Boca Raton, FL: 
CRC Press.
30  For a review of the literature, see: Phillips, B., D.  S.  Thomas, A.  Fothergill and L.  Blinn-Pike (2010).  Social Vulnerability to 
Disasters: 2nd edition.  Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press; Fothergill, A.  and L.  A.  Peek (2004).  “Poverty and disasters in the United 
States: A review of recent sociological findings.” Natural Hazards 32(1): 89-110; and Fothergill, A., et al.  (1999).  “Race, ethnicity and 
disasters in the United States: A review of the literature.” Disasters 23(2): 156-173.; Bolin, Bob.  2006.  “Race, Class, Ethnicity, and 
Disaster Vulnerability.” In Handbook of Disaster Research edited by H.  Rodriguez, E.L.  Quarantelli, and R.R.  Dynes.  
31  Norris, F.  H., F.  P.  Stevens, F.  Pfefferbaum, K.  F.  Wyche, and R.  L.  Pfefferbaum.  2008.  “Community Resilience as a Metaphor, 
Theory, Set of Capacities, and Strategy for Community Readiness.” American Journal of Community Psychology 41: 127-150.
32  Lin, Nan.  2000.  “Inequality in Social Capital.” Contemporary Sociology 29(6): 785-795.
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These individuals may have the fewest connections 
to help them navigate complex eligibility rules or they 
may not have access to others who can assist them in 
removing debris, for example.
Other researchers define vulnerability in “structural” 
terms.  In this framework, social structures can shape 
one’s vulnerability.  Discriminatory policies, norms, or 
cultural attitudes could lead to racial or ethnic minori-
ties being more vulnerable.  For example, housing 
assistance programs without bi-lingual staff could 
disadvantage non-English speaking populations, who 
are unable to access assistance programs.  Similarly, 
racial biases could lead claims adjusters to under-
value property losses among racial minority residents.
For the purposes of this report and the others in the 
Briefing Report series, we examine whether residents’ 
race, gender, or economic class play a role in disaster 
recovery processes.  Rather than subscribing to any 
particular theory of vulnerability we will let the weight 
of evidence speak for itself.
cont’d
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The S-CAFH Study was designed to examine the impact of Hurricane Sandy on 
the geographical area denoted as the Disaster Footprint, presented in Figure 3.   
Approximately 1,047,000 people live within this geographical area, encompassing 
411,000 households.  
The Disaster Footprint was generated by our study team based on three criteria:
1.   The nine counties in New Jersey rated as having had “Very High Impact” according to the FEMA Modeling Task 
Force (MOTF) Hurricane Sandy Impact Analysis were selected.   These included Atlantic, Bergen, Cape May, Essex, 
Hudson, Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean and Union counties in New Jersey.
2.  Once these nine counties were selected, the sampling frame was further narrowed by three geographical 
layers:
a. Census block groups which experienced a storm surge of at least one foot, or 
b. Census block groups in which at least 20% of all housing units sustained “Minor Damage,” “Major 
Damage,” or were “Destroyed,” as per FEMA assessments, or 
c. ZIP codes which reported a greater than average number (z-score >0) of valid FEMA Housing Assistance 
registrations.
3.  All three of the above geographical layers were overlaid so that any census block group that satisfied ANY of 
the three criteria was extracted and merged to create the final Disaster Footprint.   
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Disaster Footprint
Figure 3




The S-CAFH Study recruited a random sample of New Jersey residents from 
those areas in the state that experienced: a) storm surges; b) flooding; and/or 
c) substantial property damages. Data was collected for the longitudinal cohort 
study between August 2014 and April 2015. 
Respondents were sampled from census block groups 
taken from the nine most impacted counties in New 
Jersey exposed to Hurricane Sandy based on these 
criteria and further explained in Appendix A (Atlantic, 
Bergen, Cape May, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, 
Monmouth, Ocean, and Union).  Within the nine 
counties, 832 census block groups were categorized 
into eight sampling strata by region, damage, and 
poverty.   These strata were developed so as to ensure 
the research team would have sufficient power of 
analysis among these sub-categories.  From each 
of these strata, census block groups were randomly 
chosen resulting in the selection of 52 census block 
groups within the nine counties from the 832 total 
census block groups.  Within each of these 52 selected 
census blocks, households were randomly selected for 
an interview.
Community-based interviewers conducted face-to-
face surveys with adult members of the selected 
New Jersey households in the study.  Once randomly 
selected to be eligible for an interview, residents had 
to be the primary household resident at the time of the 
storm.  A cohort summary can be found in Appendix 
C  Table 1.   The survey instrument for the first wave of 
data collection covered such topics as the decisions 
households made related to both evacuation and to 
recovery issues, their health and well-being, and the 
help they sought or received.  In addition to learning 
about the adult or adults in the household, the team 
also asked specific questions about children living in 
the house, so as to learn of any long-term impacts of 
the storm on young people.   Wave 2 of data collection 
will be conducted between April 2015 and June 2015 
and cover additional thematic areas of recovery.  After 
data collection, a weighting protocol was applied using 
sampling weights that (1) compensate for unequal 
probabilities of selection such as damage, (2) compen-
sate for non-response33, and (3) adjust for weighted 
sample distribution among key variables of interest. 
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The findings reported in this PLACE Briefing Report are mainly drawn from data 
in the Appendix Tables, where readers can find additional information regarding 
our statistical analyses.   The sections that follow align with the four questions 
introduced at the beginning of this Briefing Report:
 Decisions:  As the storm approached, what deci-
sions did New Jersey residents make regarding 
evacuating or sheltering in place, and why?
 Disruption and Destruction:  After the storm 
passed, what was the magnitude of destruction 
and disruption in people’s lives?
 Help Needed and Sought: What housing-related 
help was needed by New Jersey residents, and 
what help was sought?
 Vulnerability: Were certain groups exposed to 
the storm more vulnerable to its effects or more 
adversely impacted?
Decisions
As Hurricane Sandy approached landfall the gov-
ernor and local political leaders, as well as state 
and local emergency managers, ordered a number 
of New Jersey residents to evacuate their homes.  
Approximately 240,000 people in the Disaster Footprint 
were living in areas subject to these mandatory evacu-
ation orders.34   Twenty-eight percent of the residents 
in these mandatory evacuation zones left their homes 
before the storm (see Appendix C Tables 4 and 5); the 
other seventy-two percent of residents living in man-
datory evacuation zones elected to stay in their homes 
during the storm.   
34  New Jersey Executive Order 104.  October 27, 2012.
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Across the entire Disaster Footprint, covering those 
areas that were subject to mandatory evacuation 
orders and those areas that were not subject to man-
datory evacuation, approximately 24% of residents 
evacuated their homes before Sandy struck.
Evacuation rates varied according to the characteristics 
of individuals and households.  As illustrated in Figure 
4, those residents who lived in the households that 
sustained the most damage – and which may have 
been at most risk before the storm struck – were also 
the most likely to evacuate: 63% of residents whose 
homes suffered major damage (see Appendix C for 
damage definitions) evacuated their homes before the 
storm.   While such evacuation rates may be inter-
preted as high, nearly 40% – or 44,000 residents whose 
homes suffered major structural damage – remained in 
their homes during the storm.
Beyond damage, there were also differences in evacu-
ation rates by different characteristics of residents, 
such as gender or region.  For example, there were 
significant differences in evacuation rates by gender, 
in that 29% of women evacuated compared to 16% of 
men, and by region, in that 27% of residents in South 
Jersey evacuated compared to 13% of residents in 
North Jersey.  
When viewing individual rates, as illustrated in Figure 
4, it is difficult to interpret whether any particular 
characteristic is driving the finding.  For example, 
is it the case that men are generally less likely to 
evacuate, regardless as to their income or where they 
live, or is that most of the men with whom we spoke 
live in North Jersey and that women from North 
Jersey would have answered similarly?  In order to 
disentangle the influence of these characteristics on 
evacuation rates, we applied a logistic regression 
equation that considers all of these factors simul-
taneously.   Table 1 describes the odds of residents 
evacuating before the storm when considering various 
socio-demographic characteristics.  While such charac-
teristics are often considered to be highly associated 
with evacuation decisions, this analysis demonstrates 
that only a handful were significant for residents in 
the Disaster Footprint, in this case region, gender, and 
race.  Residents living in South Jersey [see Figure 4] 
were over 20 times as likely to evacuate compared to 
residents in the North.  Hispanic residents were over 
twice as likely to evacuate as white residents while 
men were significantly less likely (0.54) to evacuate 
compared to women. 
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR ODDS RATIO
Living in South Jersey, compared to North Jersey 20.25
Black residents, compared to white residents 0.91
Men, compared to women 0.54
Age group 65+, compared to 36-64 year olds 1.73
Age group 19-35, compared to 36-64 year olds 0.64
Hispanic residents, compared to white residents 2.07
Households with children, compared to those without 1.05
Households with income less than $20k per year, compared to $21-99k/year 0.62
Households with income greater than $100k per year, compared to $21-99k/year 1.05
Note:  Only the p-values of odds ratios < .05 represent statistically significant differences.  Statistically significant variables are bolded.  
TABLE 1. ODDS OF EVACUATING BEFORE THE STORM, BY SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
cont’d
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Interestingly, there were several factors that were not 
significantly associated with a greater likelihood of 
evacuating when holding all other factors constant: 
Residents living in mandatory evacuation zones were 
not more likely to evacuate than residents who were 
not placed under mandatory evacuation orders.  In 
other words, residents evacuated at approximately the 
same rates, regardless as to whether they were subject 
to a mandatory evacuation order.  Older residents 
were not more likely to evacuate than were younger 
residents; households with children were not more 
likely to evacuate than households without children; 
and there were no significant differences in evacuation 
rates by income categories – neither those living in 
the wealthiest homes, those in middle-class homes, 
or those living in poverty were more or less likely to 
evacuate, all other demographic factors being equal.
The reasons why residents elected to evacuate their 
homes before the storm, or decided to shelter in 
their homes rather than leave, reveal a lot about the 
calculus of such evacuation decision-making.  As 
illustrated in Appendix C Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 5, 
the primary reasons for evacuation decision-making 
were varied.  










































There are a number of factors underlying such deci-
sions as to whether to stay or to leave in the face of 
a hurricane.  Some people are more risk-averse than 
others, and adopt the conservative attitude that it is 
“better to be safe than sorry” whereas others are more 
tolerant of risk.   There is also the matter of trust and 
confidence in scientific and political authorities – those 
with greater trust in such authority may be more 
inclined to comply with evacuation orders, whereas 
those with less trust may be less disposed to leave.   
It is noteworthy that very few residents listed such 
logistical reasons as homebound elderly or pets as 
reasons for not evacuating, reasons that historically 
are often listed by non-evacuating storm survivors 
in other parts of the country.  What is perhaps most 
important to remember, however, is that evacuation 
decisions are complex, complicated, and informed by 
many cognitive, personal, social, and structural fac-
tors.  As such, there is rarely one reason why people 
do or do not evacuate, but instead myriad components 
that ultimately influence the final decision.  
It is also worthwhile to consider the consequences of 
such decisions.  Approximately 110,000 residents in 
the Disaster Footprint experienced major structural 
damage to their homes or their homes were destroyed. 
That would suggest that during the storm they were 
at much greater risk of injury or death because of the 
storm’s threat to their home.  Nevertheless, approxi-
mately 44,000 of those residents did not evacuate their 
homes.   This includes approximately 9,000 residents 
who were living in an area under a mandatory evacua-
tion order at the time.  
Disruption and Destruction
As noted in the introductory section above, Hur-
ricane Sandy was a substantial storm that caused 
substantial flooding and wind damage in the exposed 
region.  Yet, even within the boundaries of the Disas-
ter Footprint there was considerable variation in the 
type and distribution of housing damage.  Overall, 
about 11% of people in this geographical area – ap-
proximately 110,000 residents – were living in homes 
that sustained major structural damage or that were 
destroyed as a result of Sandy.  This damage defini-
tion, drawn from the U.S.  Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) guidelines (see Appendix 
C for definition), includes those homes that involved 
the total loss of the structure as well as whose floors, 
NO DAMAGE OR AFFECTED MINOR DAMAGE MAJOR DAMAGE OR DESTROYED
Approximate population 800,000 90,000 110,000
Exposure and Concurrent Damages
% with wind damage 31% 79% 53%
% with flood damage 18% 63% 85%
% with mold damage 11% 28% 45%
% who lost heat 77% 84% 96%
% who lost hot water 46% 81% 94%
% who lost a vehicle 7% 12% 28%
Displacement
% displaced for 3 or more months 5% 7% 72%
Economic Burden
% who spent all or quite a bit of their savings 6% 19% 54%
% who used all or quite a bit of their credit 3% 15% 21%
† Each of the rates reported in each cell in the table represents a proportion of all residents with a specific characteristic.  
They are each distinct, and as such all the rates will not add up to 100%.
TABLE 2. DAMAGE AND EXPOSURE
cont’d
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walls, or foundations were so damaged that it would 
require at least 30 days to repair, during which time the 
house was uninhabitable.  An additional 9%, or 90,000 
residents, were living in homes that experienced 
“minor damage,” which according to HUD guidance 
includes homes that were damaged and uninhabitable 
but which could be made habitable in a short period 
of time.   The storm and recovery experiences of these 
nearly 200,000 residents is markedly different than 
those residents whose homes were undamaged or 
only slightly affected.  
Table 2 illustrates some selected characteristics of 
storm-related damage and disruption to homes, prop-
erty, and livelihoods based on the overall severity of 
damage.  More detailed data tables regarding damage 
and destruction can be found in Appendix C  Tables 2-3 
and Appendix C  Tables 6-7.  It is noteworthy that even 
among homes without structural damage there was 
considerable exposure to the storm’s effects and sig-
nificant disruption.  A fair number of homes sustained 
wind, flood, or mold damage, and the homes also lost 
heat and hot water (approximately 88% of all homes 
lost electricity in the Disaster Footprint).   
Flooding exposure is clearly associated with greater 
damage.   Among the homes sustaining major struc-
tural damage, 84% experienced flood damage, almost 
a third as much more flooding damage than those 
homes that only experienced minor damage.   Wind 
damage, on the other hand, was more likely associ-
ated with minor damage.   Residents whose homes 
were catastrophically or substantially damaged were 
approximately twice as likely to lose a car as were 
those whose homes suffered minor damage, and 
nearly four times as likely as those whose homes were 
generally unaffected.   Strikingly, a little over two-thirds 
of these residents were displaced from their homes for 
three months or more.
The financial implications of such variation in housing 
damage are also illustrated in Table 2 (as well as in 
Appendix C  Tables 12-13 in greater detail).  Whereas 
one in twenty residents had to tap most of their sav-
ings or credit if their home was minimally affected, 
approximately one in four did for minor damage, and 
as many as one in two did if their home sustained 
major damage.
Help Needed and Sought
Since this report is focused on housing-related im-
pacts of the storm, the examination of the types 
of help needed and sought are similarly related to 
housing restoration, repair, and reconstruction.  Later 
Briefing Reports in this series will explore other types 
of help needed by people exposed to the storm, such 
as health or social service needs, as well as the unmet 
needs and service gaps still confronting New Jersey 
residents.
The data for this section are primarily drawn from Ap-
pendix C Tables 8 through 13.  Discussion of housing 
costs sustained in a disaster often begin with ques-
tions of insurance coverage (see Appendix C Tables 
8-9), since that is often the first resource accessed for 
repair and restoration.  The adequacy of the residen-
tial insurance market has substantial implications for 
those public programs designed to be payers of last 
resort: If residents are appropriately insured, they 
will have less need to rely upon costly public housing 
assistance funds.  Moreover, most homeowners with 
residential mortgages are required to have home-
owner’s insurance, and those living in flood zones are 
often required to have flood insurance as well. 
As illustrated in Figure 6, most homeowners in the 
Disaster Footprint do have homeowner’s insurance 
(98%), and among those homeowners whose homes 
sustained major damage, virtually all (91%) filed a 
claim against their coverage.  
Flood insurance coverage (35%) and windstorm insur-
ance coverage (18%) were much less common among 
homeowners in the study area.  However, homeown-
ers whose homes sustained major damage were more 






than twice as likely to have flood insurance as were 
the average homeowners in the Disaster Footprint, 
perhaps reflecting they were subject to mandatory 
flood insurance coverage or their awareness that they 
were at higher risk for flooding. Approximately thirty-
five percent of renters had renter’s insurance, and 
among those renters living in homes that sustained 
catastrophic damage, all made use of their insurance 
coverage.  The Problems Report, a future Briefing 
Report on unmet needs and service gaps, will explore 
the adequacy of insurance coverage and other finan-
cial supports in greater detail.
New Jersey residents exposed to Hurricane Sandy 
had a variety of housing assistance needs, as illustrat-
ed in Appendix C Tables 10-11.  Across all residents, 
the greatest expressed housing needs were for: 
  Debris removal (19%),
 Housing restoration help (16%), and
 Help paying utilities (12%). 
Needs varied by location.  Twice as many people in 
South Jersey needed help restoring or repairing their 
homes (19%) than did residents in North Jersey (10%). 
The types of assistance needed generally split along 
one of two lines: either instrumental help engaging in 
specific repair, mitigation, and clean-up tasks (such as 
elevating one’s home or removing debris), or financial 
help associated with paying for mortgage, rent, or 
utilities.35  Residents whose homes were significantly 
damaged were much more likely than other residents 
to need help with such instrumental assistance as 
restoration or repair (74%), debris removal (63%), 
cont’d
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Comparison of Insurance Rates and Claims between All and those with Major Housing Damage
Figure 6
35  It is possible that residents’ expressed need for help in elevating their home is actually a financial need, although the wording of the 
question – “Did you or anyone in your household have a problem or need help with elevating your home?” – suggests more of an 
emphasis on the instrumental actions involved.
furnishings for the home (39%), and house elevation 
(38%), and they were also much more likely to apply 
for assistance. Greater housing damage also translated 
into greater likelihood that residents would apply for 
assistance.   Those who experienced major damage 
to their homes were 30% to 50% more likely to apply 
for assistance than were residents whose homes 
sustained minor damage. 
There were a number of housing assistance programs 
implemented after the storm.  Among the largest state-
run programs were the Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, 
Elevation and Mitigation (RREM) state program 
totaling $710 million, the Homeowner Resettlement 
program ($215 million), and the Sandy Homeowner 
and Renter Assistance Program (SHRAP) with $117 mil-
lion.36   The first of those two assistance programs were 
funded with federal Community Development Block 
Grant dollars, and SHRAP was funded through the 
Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) program.  SHRAP 
provided financial assistance to New Jersey residents 
of up to $15,000 to cover rent or mortgage costs, utility 
expenses, furnishings, and other essential items.37    
There were no income requirements or financial 
ceilings for SHRAP eligibility; the principal eligibility 
requirements were that the resident’s cost was Sandy-
related and that the SHRAP payment could not reflect 
a duplicate payment received through another assis-
tance program or from private insurance.  This report 
focuses only on the SSBG-funded SHRAP program, 
since it was managed by the Department of Human 
Services, a member of the Public Partnership Group 
advising the study authors.  Since no explicit questions 
were asked about other named housing assistance 
programs, such as RREM, we cannot directly compare 
the effectiveness or reach of all of these programs.  
Our analysis of one named program, SHRAP, illustrates 
residents’ general awareness of the program and their 
use of that program.38   
As illustrated in Appendix C  Tables 12-13, fewer than 
one in four residents had heard of SHRAP.  Among 
those who had heard of SHRAP only 20% applied for 
assistance.  Residents whose homes suffered major 
damage were over twice as likely to have heard of 
SHRAP (47%) as were those whose homes suffered 
minor damage (15%) or no damage (21%).   Those 
whose homes experienced major damage were also 
far more likely to apply for SHRAP.   Sixty-two percent 
of homeowners with major damage applied for SHRAP, 
compared to 33% of homeowners with minor damage, 
and 6% of homeowners with no damage.
Social Vulnerability and Place
This Briefing Report examines the experiences of 
three historically vulnerable groups: (1) those who are 
economically disadvantaged, (2) seniors, and (3) Black 
or Hispanic residents. The rationale for the vulnerabil-
ity of individuals or households within these groups 
could be attributed to either the resource framework 
or the structural framework introduced in an earlier 
section. Clearly, not all individuals within each of 
these groupings are equivalent: A senior with a rich 
36  http://www.nj.gov/humanservices/dfd/programs/shrap/, accessed on April 1, 2015.  According to one state official from the New 
Jersey Department of Human Services (DHS), SHRAP expended $117 million over two years, making it the largest single Sandy 
assistance program in the DHS portfolio.
37   Some housing assistance programs had very limited application windows. For example, the LMI Homeowners Rebuilding Program, 
designed to provide reconstruction, rehabilitation and elevation assistance to homeowners of low-to-moderate income (LMI) who 
were impacted by Superstorm Sandy and whose damaged primary residence is located in one of the nine most impacted counties, 
only accepted applications between January 5 through March 21, 2015. 
38  As a follow-up to our question about SHRAP we asked residents whether they had applied to other housing assistance programs.  
Given that it was possible that residents had in fact received SHRAP assistance without being aware of the program’s formal name, 
we analyzed the open-ended responses to our question probing for the name of the other housing assistance programs.  Of 401 
residents who described other housing programs, 91 (22.7%) named RREM, 253 named FEMA housing subsidies (63.1%), 37 named 
the Homeowner Resettlement Program (9.2%).  Virtually all residents were able to identify other housing assistance programs by 
name, lending confidence to our findings about SHRAP, and that it was correctly identified by most residents.






network of friends and families and a comfortable 
retirement account is not the same as an isolated, 
homebound senior living from one Social Security  
check to the next. Future analyses, beyond the scope 
of this descriptive Briefing Report, can investigate 
such nuances. In this report, though, any differences 
found between these vulnerable groups and their 
“nonvulnerable” counterparts would suggest that 
there are significant and profound impacts associated 
with their particular vulnerability characteristic.
A number of studies have described income gradients 
that effectively lead to a “poverty penalty,” in which 
those individuals and households who are socio-
economically disadvantaged or marginalized suffer 
significantly more harms, and are often more exposed 
to the hazard itself.  For the purposes of providing a 
sharp contrast, this Briefing Report compares those 
individuals living in households earning less than 
$20,000 annually with those individuals in households 
earning more than $100,000 annually.  Generally 
speaking, the New Jersey residents living in the Di-
saster Footprint who are in the poorer households are 
more likely to be younger, more likely to be Hispanic, 
less likely to be married or partnered, have less formal 
education, and more likely to be renters than the 
wealthier residents (see Appendix C Table 1).  Table 3, 
below, illustrates some of the other significant differ-
ences drawn from across the Appendix C Tables.
This table illustrates a selection of the starkest differ-
ences between the poorest and wealthiest residents, 
and suggests that access to resources and neighbor-
hood context is clearly different depending on finan-
cial resources.  There may be a cumulative effect, 
as well.  Those who are poorer are likelier to have 
multiple needs – they are likely to have more complex 
housing needs, are less likely to have access to the 
resources available to address those needs (or feel 
comfortable or sufficiently knowledgeable to access 
the resources), and may live in chaotic neighborhood 
environments that amplify their housing needs.
Seniors over the age of 65 years old do not reveal 
the same depth of need or vulnerability as poorer 
residents.  In fact, when examining certain aspects 
of recovery, it is often just the opposite, in that in 
certain circumstances seniors have better recovery 
ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
<$20,000
ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
>$100,000
Housing damage and displacement
% reporting mold damage in their home 40% 12%
% displaced for 3 or more months 29% 18%
Housing needs and services
% needing help restoring their home 30% 12%
% needing help paying rent or mortgage 19% 3%
% needing help furnishing home 11% 4%
% needing help paying utilities 34% 3%
% having difficulties paying immediate housing costs 48% 5%
% spending all or most of their savings on recovery 28% 7%
% spending all or most of their credit on recovery 21% 3%
% of homeowners who heard of SHRAP 8% 24%
Residents’ sense of their community
% with a strong emotional connection to their community 33% 47%
% who are frequently worried about disorder in their neighborhood 17% 10%
TABLE 3. INCOME DIFFERENCES IN HOUSING DAMAGE, NEEDS, AND SENSE OF COMMUNITY
cont’d
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outcomes. Seniors were the least likely to have had 
difficulty immediately following the storm in paying 
for housing costs, generators, and utilities. They 
also indicate a stronger sense of community and are 
less worried about their neighborhood than younger 
residents (Appendix C Table 15). Despite these , there 
are still notable aspects of recovery which are more 
difficult for seniors.  Seniors are more likely to be 
displaced for three or more months due to the storm 
than younger residents (Appendix C  Table 7) and 
statistically more likely to need help clearing debris 
and elevating their homes (Appendix C  Table 11).
As with seniors, the differences among white, black, 
and Hispanic residents are less obvious than those 
between the poorest and wealthiest residents; but 
are most striking in examining those who accessed 
services.  While white, black, and Hispanic residents 
were equally likely to express needing help to clean 
debris; paying for a rent or mortgage; and paying for 
furnishings; blacks and Hispanics were significantly 
less likely to apply for assistance (Appendix C  Table 
11).  As illustrated in Figure 7,  Blacks and Hispanics 
were approximately two or three times less likely to 
apply for assistance for paying rent or mortgage or 
furnishing their home, and significantly less likely to 
apply for SHRAP despite hearing about the program 
at the same rates as white residents.  In contrast, 
black and Hispanic residents were more likely to have 
spent all of their savings on recovery expenses in 
comparison to whites (Appendix C  Table 13), perhaps 
reflecting the financial burden of paying for recovery 
on their own.  Both black and Hispanic residents are 
less likely to report as strong a sense of community 
connection as are white residents, and both are more 
frequently worried about the physical disorder to their 
communities than are white residents.  
In summary, there is a consistent case to be made for 
the presence of a “poverty penalty,” a mix of positive 
and negative contributing factors in the vulnerability 
of seniors, and a significant gap in applying for ser-
vices impacting racial or ethnic minority populations.   
Resilience in seniors in the aftermath of Sandy in 
comparison to younger groups may be attributable to 
age, experience, and income.  However, the vulnera-
bility reported by minority populations calls for further 
exploration for a potential relationship with income, 
poverty, and other logistical barriers to service access- 
something that will be explored in the forthcoming 
Briefing Report on unmet needs.





























This PLACE Report focuses on issues associated with 
residents’ homes and housing.  Assuring safe and 
stable housing is one of the most important individual 
and collective goals after a catastrophic disaster.  
Individuals and families rely upon homes for shelter, 
sanctuary, and often as a significant economic as-
set; in turn, communities rely upon a strong housing 
base as a means of maintaining or enhancing political 
strength and community resilience, as well as serving 
as linchpins for social and economic growth.  While 
many residents in New Jersey’s Disaster Footprint 
are making substantial progress in rebuilding their 
homes and communities, there are clearly still pockets 
of damage and disruption, even two and a half years 
after the storm.  As storms approach, it is critically im-
portant that people be warned and move out harm’s 
way – either based on their own resources or with the 
assistance of local agencies.  This report helps the 
reader to understand who left and who did not prior 
to Hurricane Sandy, as well as the immediate term 
impacts of the storm in terms of housing damage and 
destruction.  
Among the many findings and data points described 
in the report, four themes with policy and program-
matic implications emerged:
 Decision-making: In the hours and days before 
the storm’s landfall, public officials made repeated 
efforts to persuade New Jersey residents living in 
vulnerable areas to evacuate.  Approximately 24% 
of the residents living in the most highly-exposed 
areas of the nine affected counties, or about 
240,000 people, were under a mandatory evacu-
ation order.  Over one-third of those residents 
complied with the mandatory evacuation order.  
South Jersey residents were twice as likely to 
evacuate as were North Jersey residents.39  Those 
in the south were more likely to believe their home 
was unsafe in the face of the storm,  more likely 
to have had prior hurricane experience, and more 
likely to have a place to go to. 
  Implications:  More targeted risk communi-
cation and warning messages are needed.  
Public officials should consider testing and 
vetting messages using community engage-
ment strategies, with a particular emphasis 
on “market segmentation” approaches and 
specific attention to messaging for vulnerable 
populations;
 Destruction and Disruption: Approximately 
110,000 residents in the nine hardest-hit 
counties were living in homes that suffered 
major structural damage or were destroyed, 
and an additional 90,000 people were living in 
homes that sustained enough damage to make 
them uninhabitable for a short period of time.  
There were substantial corollary impacts even 
among those residents whose homes were 
characterized as structurally undamaged– 31% 
reported wind damage, 18% reported flood 
damage, and 11% reported mold damage.  
Eighty-eight percent of people lost power and 
between about half and three-quarters lost hot 
water and heat because of Sandy. 
 Implications:  Long-term recovery metrics that 
measure the progress of repair and restoration 
of damaged housing are needed since this 
represents a central aspect of individual and 
community recovery.  These recovery metrics 
should be able to distinguish progress within 
each category of FEMA-defined housing 
damage: destroyed, major, minor, affected, or 
none;
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39  North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Union Counties; South: Atlantic, Cape May, Monmouth, Ocean Counties.emphasis on the 
instrumental actions involved.
 Housing help needed and sought:  New Jersey 
residents’ housing needs are complex and cumu-
lative.  Approximately one-quarter of residents 
living in the Disaster Footprint, about 240,000 
individuals, needed practical assistance in clearing 
debris, repairing and restoring homes, and 
elevating their homes to protect them from future 
storms.  Sixteen percent of New Jersey residents 
expressed a need for financial help in paying 
rent, mortgage, or utilities, about half of whom 
also had expressed a need for practical repair 
services.  For housing-related needs such as 
debris clearing or replacing furnishings, between 
40-50% of residents with a need applied for 
assistance; for elevating, restoring, or repairing a 
home, approximately 80% applied for assistance.  
Still, despite many residents applying for aid, only 
25% of residents in the Disaster Footprint had 
heard of the state’s Sandy Homeowner and Renter 
Assistance Program (SHRAP), a widely-available 
and accessible program that offered up to $15,000 
in financial assistance.  Among those who had 
heard of SHRAP, only one in five had applied for 
assistance, although among those whose homes 
suffered major structural damage, nearly two-
thirds applied for help.
 Implications:  Public officials should develop 
targeted communication strategies that are 
based on lists or registries of owners and 
renters of damaged housing.  Housing damage 
is a risk factor for financial stress and for 
health-related stress as well (as described in 
the PERSON Briefing Report).  Messages can 
focus upon available programs and services 
with clear eligibility criteria; 
 Vulnerability:  As with so many historic disasters, 
there was a sharp income gradient associated 
with both post-storm need and with help asked 
for and received.  Those with the least amount 
of income reported the greatest housing needs, 
while those with the greatest household income 
were generally more likely to apply for assistance.  
This “poverty penalty” seemed reasonably consis-
tent: in addition to starting out with less stability 
in their lives, in that those in the lowest income 
bracket were far less likely to be married or part-
nered, far less likely to have achieved higher or 
advanced educational degrees, and far less likely 
to be homeowners, this impoverished population 
was much more likely to spend all or most of their 
savings or credit on recovery needs.
 Implications:  Financial counseling services 
should be developed as part of disaster case 
management, in order to help storm victims 
identify and access all available assistance 
programs and manage their financial assets 
appropriately.  In addition, officials should con-
sider the development of micro-loan programs 
for storm-affected populations with limited 
financial means.
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The strategic objectives for the S-CAFH study were two-fold: (1) to create a study sample of 1,000 households 
representative of residential areas within New Jersey exposed to Hurricane Sandy, and (2) to have sufficient 
numbers of cases within the sample for sub-group analyses that can be conducted of “high” damage versus 
“not high damage” areas, “northern” versus “southern” regions, and households with low income versus all 
other income levels. Addressing the first objective enables us to estimate population-level impacts and needs 
across the hardest-hit areas of the state. Addressing the second objective enables us to examine the extent to 
which New Jersey residents’ decisions, needs, health effects, and recovery may be explained by the damage 
they were exposed to, by regional differences, and by access to economic resources. To accomplish these 
objectives, we defined an area within New Jersey that was exposed to the storm (referred to as the “S-CAFH 
Disaster Footprint”), and developed a multi-stage stratified sampling design to yield sufficient numbers of cases 
for sub-group analyses. Sampling and post-stratification weights were developed and applied to the data once 
sampling and data collection were complete. The various elements of this approach are described in more detail 
in this appendix.   
Disaster Footprint
The S-CAFH Study was designed to examine the impact of Hurricane Sandy on the Disaster Footprint presented 
in Appendix A Figure 3. Approximately 1,047,000 people—including about 411,000 households—live within this 
geographical area. The Disaster Footprint covers an area approximately 14% of the state, and that the population 
represents about 12% of the state. The disaster footprint was created based on three criteria: 
1.  The Hurricane Sandy Impact Analysis by the FEMA Modeling Task Force (MOTF) was used to identify the nine 
counties in New Jersey with a “Very High Impact” rating. The FEMA MOTF impact model is a composite of 
storm surge, wind, and precipitation. These very high impact counties had a population of over 10,000 persons 
exposed to storm survey in addition to more than 8 inches of precipitation during the storm and an estimate 
of over $100M in wind-related damages. The counties that met these criteria included Atlantic, Bergen, Cape 
May, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean and Union.
2.  Once these nine counties were selected, the study team developed a sampling frame using a geographic 
information system (GIS) based procedure. Storm surge within the nine counties was identified using FEMA 
storm surge raster data based on satellite imagery and further filtered to include all areas with storm surge of 
greater than or equal to one foot. Housing damage data was acquired based on FEMA damage assessments.   
These data were available for the majority of housing lots in high impact zones. Lots which were classified 
by FEMA as minor (Full Verified Loss of $5,000-$17,000), major (Full Verified Loss of more than $17,000), or 
destroyed (indicated by an Individual Assistance (IA) inspector) were aggregated at the census block group 
level. Block groups with at least 20% of all assessed units having one of the prior three classifications were 
then selected for inclusion in the study. FEMA Individual Assistance data were acquired at the ZIP code level.   
Valid registrations were summed and standardized (z-score) for the ZIP codes in the nine counties and those 
which summed to greater than the mean (a z-score of >0) were selected to be part of the footprint.
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3.  Finally, these three resultant geographic layers were superimposed upon one another and any census block 
group, which intersected any one of the three layers was selected to be included in the final Disaster Footprint. 
In summary, the Disaster Footprint within the nine high impact counties is composed of:
a. Census block groups which experienced a storm surge of at least one foot, or
b.  Census block groups in which at least 20% of all housing units sustained “Minor Damage,” “Major Damage,” 
or were “Destroyed,” per FEMA assessments, or
c.  ZIP codes which reported a greater than average number (z-score >0) of valid FEMA Housing Assistance 
registrations.
Sampling 
When conducting a household survey, researchers often use a random sample, which is a subset of individuals 
that have been randomly selected from the population. Sometimes, because researchers cannot ask survey 
questions of every member of the population—at least in heavily populated areas such as the one where we 
were working—a smaller subset of people is drawn at random that is intended to be representative of the 
larger population. We first determined the target number of New Jersey residents to be sampled by calculating 
the number necessary to have sufficient power in the sample, which would allow us to detect meaningful 
differences on key characteristics. In other words, there had to be enough people randomly sampled who 
could potentially exhibit a given characteristic to detect statistically significant differences between groups.   
Therefore, the research team determined that we needed a target sample size of 1,075 respondents.    
APPENDIX A TABLE 1. CENSUS BLOCK GROUPS USED FOR SAMPLING IN THE DISASTER FOOTPRINT
N %
Geography
  North 262 32
South 570 68
Damage
High (> 40% of households > minor) 79 10%
Low (affected) 393 47%
Unassessed 360 43%
Children
High children (>35% of households have children) 305 37%
Low children(<35% of households have children) 527 63%
Poverty (#families)
High poverty ( >30% family below poverty) 249 30%
Low poverty ( <30% family below poverty) 579 69%
N/A - Block groups with 0 families 4 <1%
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One approach to selecting study respondents is to conduct a simple random sample, in which all the households 
within a given area of interest, in this case the Disaster Footprint, would be enumerated and then 1,075 of them, 
would be “picked out of a hat.” Although this selection strategy does provide the basis for estimating the  
characteristics of the entire population within the Disaster Footprint, it would not have guaranteed that there 
would be enough cases in the sub-groups of research interest – particularly those households that suffered 
varying degrees of damage or that were living in lower socio-economic neighborhoods. Thus, it also would not 
allow our team to make estimates that were reliably representative of these smaller populations.    
An alternative approach, which our team ultimately employed, was to first group the “neighborhoods”  
(census block groups) into different strata, such as neighborhoods in the north, or neighborhoods that  
suffered considerable housing damage, or neighborhoods that were composed of households living at or below 
a poverty threshold. Once this grouping was completed, we could then randomly select households within these 
strata and make sure that there would be enough households to be representative. The table below shows the 
distribution of block groups by these characteristics of interest:
40  When sufficient block groups are available, high damage and high poverty strata are sampled at approximately a 2:1 ratio
APPENDIX A TABLE 2. MATRIX OF CENSUS BLOCKS IN DISASTER FOOTPRINT BY STRATA
DISASTER  FOOTPRINT
Total # block groups 832
Sampled # block groups 52
GEOGRAPHY North South
Total # block groups 262 (31%) 570 (69%)
Sampled # block groups 18 (35%) 34 (65%)
DAMAGE40 High Low High Low
Total # block groups 3 256 76 493
Sampled # block groups 3 15 24 10
POVERTY High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total # block groups 1 2 99 157 16 60 133 360
Sampled # block groups 1 2 12 3 13 11 7 3
SAMPLED HOUSEHOLDS 50 100 300 75 325 275 175 75
COMPLETED HOUSEHOLDS 58 97 118 52 257 190 154 74
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Respondents surveyed in the S-CAFH data were sampled from a total of 832 census block groups (262 in the 
North, 570 in the South) taken from nine New Jersey counties exposed to Hurricane Sandy (Atlantic, Bergen, 
Cape May, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean, and Union). The 832 block groups were categorized 
into eight sampling strata by region, damage, and poverty. From each of these strata census block groups were 
randomly selected resulting in the selection of 52 census block groups within the nine counties from the 832 
total census block groups (these block groups serve as primary sampling units [PSUs] from which a two-stage 
sampling plan was created41, 42).   
Within each of these 52 selected census blocks, households were randomly selected for survey interviewers, 
hired by Rutgers University and trained by the larger research collaborative, to visit their homes to attempt an 
interview. The sampling strategy employed by the S-CAFH team, including the stratifications can be found in the 
below Sampling Matrix. In this matrix, completion rates by strata are also exhibited.   
Weighting 
Even when random sampling has been used, it is important to compare the resulting survey data to population 
data, to see whether it is representative of the population. When the resulting data is different from the popula-
tion level estimates, weights are often applied in order to allow researchers to generalize the results of that data 
to the population as a whole. Surveys often have imperfections due to various real-world conditions which can 
bias population-level estimates, so these sampling weights are also used to refine such imperfections within 
reasonable margins of error.   
The S-CAFH weighting protocol used sampling weights that (1) compensate for unequal probabilities of selection 
such as damage (see above), (2) compensate for non-response, and (3) adjust for weighted sample distribution 
among key variables of interest. Specifically, base weights were calculated to map S-CAFH respondents to the 
total footprint population; subsequently, adjustments to the strata (geography, damage, and poverty) were made 
to reflect proportional distributions in relation to census block group characteristics. In addition, potential bias 
due to non-response was compensated by examining differences between target and sampled households in 
the strata; hard-to-reach housing units were adjusted by applying a correction for areas with high prevalence of 
vacant rental housing units. Adjustments were also made for gender, age, and households with children so that 
they reflect population distributions. Standard guidelines and techniques for constructing weights were applied 
in making these adjustments.43, 44  The overall 95% sampling error based on these adjustments is about 4%.    
41  Lohr, S. L. (2010). Sampling: Design and Analysis. Boston, MA: Brooks Cole Publishing.
42  Yansaneh, I. (2005). Construction and use of sampling weights. In United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,  
Designing Household Survey Samples: Practical Guidelines (pp. 119-140). New York, NY: United Nations Statistics Division.   
43  Valliant, R., Dever, J. A., & Kreuter, F. (2013). Practical Tools for Designing and Weighting Survey Samples. New York, NY: Springer.
44  Moore, W., Pedlow, S., Krishnamurty, P., & Wolter, K. (2000). National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). Chicago, IL: National 
Opinion Research Center (NORC).
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APPENDIX A TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED SURVEY DATA
SURVEY DATA
UNADJUSTED WEIGHTED
N % N %
Household Characteristics 1000 100 1,047,286 100
Region
North 325 32.5 314,186 30.0
South 675 67.5 733,100 70.0
Damage
Major/Destroyed 298 29.8 115,201 11.0
Minor 156 15.6 84,256 9.0
None/Affected 543 54.3 836,782 79.9
Missing/Don’t Know/Refused 3 0.3 1,047 0.01
Income
<20K 104 10.4 84,831 8.1
20K-50K 224 22.4 191,653 18.3
51-99K 352 35.2 384,354 36.7
100K+ 203 20.3 250,301 23.9
Missing/Don’t Know/Refused 117 11.7 136,147 13.0
Children Present in Home
Yes 300 30.0 382,259 36.5
No 700 70.0 665,027 63.5
Individual Characteristics 1000 100 1,047,286 100
Gender
Male 419 41.9 488,035 46.6
Female 577 57.7 551,920 52.7
Missing/Don’t Know/Refused 4 0.4 7,331 0.7
Age
18-35 111 11.1 251,349 24.0
36-64 563 56.3 583,338 55.7
65+ 326 32.6 211,552 20.3
Race
Non-Hispanic White 758 75.8 745,668 71.2
Non-Hispanic Black 67 6.7 105,776 10.1
Hispanic 118 11.8 138,242 13.2
Asian Pacific Islander 26 2.6 209,457 2.0
Other 31 3.1 36,655 3.5
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Field Effort
S-CAFH Field Team members conducted face-to-face and phone surveys with residents living in the Disaster 
Footprint between August 2014 and April 2015. Interviewers were rigorously trained over the course of five days 
on field protocols and on how to utilize mobile technology to conduct the survey. Team members were assigned 
to work certain census block groups and led by one of three team captains who were primarily responsible for 
managing the field effort.   
The field team started working each census block group with a list of ordered addresses per block group. To be 
eligible to participate in S-CAFH, sampled respondents had to be the primary resident of the household at the 
time of the storm. The field team attempted to survey the first 25-50 addresses on that list. Any given visit to a 
household could result in a variety of outcomes that the team member documented through a status code for 
the rest of the staff.These status codes included the following: 
1. Complete: Respondent has completed the entire interview.
2. Incomplete: Respondent has completed portions of the interview but not the entire interview.
3.  Not Available: Respondent answers the door but does not have time to complete the interview. Interviewer 
should attempt to schedule future appointment with respondent to complete the interview.
4.  Soft Refusal: Respondent answers the door but has low interest in completing the survey. Interviewers should 
attempt to persuade respondent and flip the case.
5.  Hard Refusal: Respondent answers the door and it is clear that he or she does not have any interest in  
participating in the study.    
6. No Answer: Respondent does not answer the door.    
7.  Ineligible (needs follow-up from captain): Respondent was not primary resident at the time of Hurricane 
Sandy. No contact information is given so interviewer should return the case to the team captain for tracking 
and tracing.
8.  Ineligible (has contact information): Respondent was not primary resident at the time of Hurricane Sandy.    
Interviewer is able to obtain contact information on primary resident/owner at the time of Sandy.    
9.  Bad Address: Address given to interviewer does not exist. Please note that this is different from finding a 
vacant home/lot.
10.   Vacant (needs follow-up): Interviewer arrives at sampled address to find a slab or uninhabitable/vacant 
home. This case should be returned to the team captain for tracking and tracing.
11.   No access: Interviewer arrives at sampled address to find a gated area or other barrier to physically 
obtaining entrance to the property. This case should be returned to the team captain for tracking and tracing.
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APPENDIX A TABLE 4A. FIELD EFFORT SUMMARY INCLUDING COOPERATION RATE AND RESPONSE RATE
STATUS CALCULATION #
A Completed Interviews 1000
B Eligible, no interview [C + D + E + F + H + I + J] 3692
C Refusal / break-off 1141
D No contact made because no access to sampled unit 84
E No contact made because no one reached at sampled unit 2251
F No contact made because R away or unavailable (but elig R exists) 216
G
H Physically or mentally unable **
I Language problem **
J Other reason (ex: incarcerated) 0
K Unknown eligibility, no interview [L + M + N +O] 524
L Not attempted **
M Not safe **
N Cannot locate housing unit 230
O Unknown whether there is an eligible respondent present 294
P Not eligible [Q + R + S + T + U] 1753
Q Not in sample / sampled in error 92
R Not a housing unit (including vacation rentals) 87
S Vacant / abandoned 872
T Quota has been filled (ex: replacements not used) 261
U No eligible respondent in unit meets criteria 441
Response Rate A / [A + B + K]  RR2* 19.2%
Cooperation Rate A /[A + C]  COOP2* 46.7%
Refusal Rate C/[A + B + K]  REF1* 21.9%
* In accordance with “Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys, Revised 2011,” American As-
sociation of Public Opinion Research. 
**No status codes exist for these categories, as data was collected under prior AAPOR standard.
***Completes by visit:
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Description of the S-CAFH Cohort
The participants in the Sandy Child and Family Health Study are representative of the 1,047,000 New Jersey 
residents living in the Disaster Footprint. We have assembled the cohort – principally through the sampling and 
weighting described above – so that the experiences, attitudes, and characteristics of the 1,000-member cohort 
reflect those of the actual population in this hurricane-affected area of New Jersey. This design also allows us 
to cross-tabulate the characteristics of people living in the Disaster Footprint so that we can estimate the size of 
different sub-groups, such as the rate of homeownership among people who reside in the southern part of the 
footprint. Appendix C Table 1 describes the composition of the cohort, as it has been weighted, in some detail. 
This table has been formatted so that the columns represent household-level characteristics – such as whether 
the household is in the North Jersey portion of the Disaster Footprint or the South Jersey, how much damage 
the home sustained in the storm, whether there are children living in the house, and household income – and 
the rows represent selected individual-level characteristics of the residents – their gender, age, race/ethnicity, 
marital status, education, and homeownership status.
Approximately one-third of the population of this hurricane-affected area is in the north and two-thirds in the 
south. A little over a third of all residents are living in homes with minor children present. Approximately 10% of 
residents live in households earning less than $20,000 per year.    
According to population data, and as illustrated in the maps in Appendix A Figure 1, there are some widespread 
differences between North and South Jersey. The three southern counties, Ocean, Cape May and Atlantic 
APPENDIX A TABLE 4B.  COMPLETED INTERVIEWS BY UNIQUE ATTEMPT







Total # of visits, including non-completes: 17,020
Appendix A Table 4A describes the field team’s efforts in working cases to completion. Specifically, the final 
response rate was 19.2%, the cooperation rate was 46.4%, and the refusal rate was 22.2%. The response rate is 
the proportion of all eligible individuals who agreed to participate, whether or not we were able to find them and 
recruit them. The cooperation rate is the proportion of individuals who agreed to participate from among those 
individuals with whom we spoke. The field team made repeated visits to each sampled household, returning as 
many as five times and alternating the days of the week and time of day. As illustrated in Appendix A Table 4B, 
this persistence resulted in case completions: 30% of all cases were completed at either the fourth or fifth visit.
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Demographics
Demographics
Appendix A Figure 1
County, are overwhelmingly white, with most neighborhoods between 70% and 96% white. The six northern 
counties, Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, and Middlesex, are considerably more diverse. A similar 
economic divide can be seen in the map displaying the proportion of residents who are “Poor or Struggling”45 in 
which there are greater numbers of pockets of poverty up north than in the south.
45  A designation of “Poor or Struggling” is based on the ratio of income to poverty level, using data from the US Census’s American 
Community Survey, as supplied by Social Explorer. A ratio of under 1.0 indicates a population who is doing poorly, 1.00-1.99 indicates 
a population who is struggling, under 2.0 is poor or struggling and over 2.0 is doing moderately better. The values depicted in the map 
indicate the percentage of the census block group population who is doing poorly or struggling (population with a ratio of less than 
two divided by the total population in the census block).
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A more detailed portrait of the cohort, as illustrated in Appendix C Table 1, also reveals differences in the types 
of individuals who comprise the households when they are categorized by north or south, by housing damage, 
by children living in the home, or by income:
 Women are more likely to be represented in homes with children, and in lower-income homes;  
 The population in the south is older, with proportionately twice as many seniors over 65 than in the north;
 In the south there are proportionately more homeowners, more highly educated residents, and more people 
who report that they are married or partnered; and
 White and black residents are over-represented in the wealthiest income brackets, whereas Hispanic  
residents are over-represented in the lowest income brackets.    
APPENDIX A   STUDY DESCRIPTION
cont’d
THE PLACE REPORT: SANDY CHILD AND FAMILY HEALTH (S-CAFH) STUDY 33
APPENDIX B   HOW TO INTERPRET STATISTICAL TABLES
Data tables like the ones presented in Appendix C can sometimes be difficult to interpret.  To help the reader interpret the data tables presented here, 
we have included this guide.  The boxes on this page each correspond to an explanation on the next page. 
TABLE 3.  HOUSING DAMAGE BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE / ETHNICITY








No Damage 24.0 26.2 22.3 22.6 21.4 23.6 26.9 23.5 30.2 26.3 21.1 22.7
Minor/Affected 49.8 50.8 49.3 50.0 55.7 50.0 45.1 48.8 51.2 49.1 63.2 54.6
Major/Destroyed 26.2 23.0 28.5 27.4 22.9 26.4 28.0 27.8 18.6 24.6 15.8 22.7
Type of Damage
Wind 46.1 41.8 48.1 45.2 51.9 46.3 39.6 46.1 37.2 47.4 26.3 54.6
Flood 64.5 63.5 65.2 61.3 61.8 66.2 65.0 64.8 53.5 63.2 84.2 59.1
Mold 32.0 30.7 32.7 37.1 35.9 30.6 28.8 30.0 39.5 35.1 47.4 36.4
Loss of Utility3
Heat 84.3 82.4 85.3 83.9 85.5 86.6 80.2 84.3 83.7 86.0 94.7 72.7
Hot Water 73.0 71.7 73.7 74.2 68.7 77.8 69.5 73.0 72.1 75.4 94.7 54.6
Electricity 90.6 90.6 90.5 93.6 93.9 88.9 88.7 90.5 90.7 91.2 100.0 81.8
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points.  P-values are indicated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001
1   Other includes Native American and Multiracial.  
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
3   Respondents were asked if 
ROW HEADINGS COLUMN PERCENTAGES TABLE TITLE COLUMN HEADINGS
MARGIN OF ERROR STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Footnotes to Table 3:
THE PLACE REPORT: SANDY CHILD AND FAMILY HEALTH (S-CAFH) STUDY 34
APPENDIX B   HOW TO INTERPRET STATISTICAL TABLES
cont’d
Elements of Data Tables
 Table Title: Each table in this and subsequent reports includes a title that provides a brief description of the 
content of the table.  In the sample table above, you can see that we are describing “Housing Damage” (Left 
Column) by “Individual Characteristics” (Top Row), and that the numbers in the columns should be read as 
percentages “column %.”
 Row Headings: The left column of the table lists category names in bold followed by the survey options for 
each category.  In the table above, the “Row Headings” arrow is pointing to “Type of Damage.”  Under this 
category in the survey, respondents are able to choose “Wind,” “Flood,” or “Mold” to describe the type of 
damage they experienced.  
 Column Headings: The top row of the table lists category names in bold.  Under these headings, you will see 
split columns that include divisions within that variable.  In the table above, the “Column Headings” arrow is 
pointing to “Race/Ethnicity.”  This variable is then further divided into “Non-Hispanic White,” “Non-Hispanic 
Black,” “Hispanic,” “Asian/Pacific Islander,” and “Other.” 
 Column Percentages: Aside from the sample row labeled N, all numbers should be read as column percent-
ages.  In the sample table, you can see an arrow pointing to 3 values in the column labeled “Female” within 
the survey category of “FEMA Damage Level.”  The appropriate way to read this statistic is “Of all the 
females that responded to the question regarding FEMA Damage Level, 22.3 experienced no damage, 49.3 
had property that was affected or experienced minor damage, and 28.5 had major damage or their property 
was destroyed.”
 Margin of Error: The margin of error expresses the amount of random sampling error in a survey’s results.  
It represents the likelihood that the result from a sample is close to the number one would get if the whole 
population had been surveyed.  In this case the margin of error is plus or minus five percentage points, 
meaning that the population statistic is likely within that range.  
 Statistical Significance: A p-value helps to determine statistical significance by describing the probability 
of observing such a large difference if the findings were purely by chance in two groups of exactly the 
same people.  For example, a p-value of 0.01 (or 1%) would mean that the probability of obtaining a differ-
ence between two groups that is this large (or larger) is 1%, assuming that the two groups are in fact NOT 
different.  The smaller the p value, the more evidence we have to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
research hypothesis.  Statistical significance is identified by asterisks that correspond to the levels of  * ≤ 
0.05 ** ≤ 0.01 ***≤0.001.  
 Footnotes: These are table notes that will be used to provide further clarification on category definitions, 
data points, or anything else that may not be self-explanatory.  
 Total: The total column will represent a weighted population figure. 
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APPENDIX C   PLACE REPORT DATA TABLES
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APPENDIX C TABLE 1. S-CAFH SURVEY RESPONDENTS (COLUMN % WEIGHTED DATA)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE2 CHILDREN IN THE HOME INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST M/D/R3 YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+ M/D/R
Overall (row %) 30.0 70.0 79.9 9.0 11.0 <0.01 36.5 63.5 8.1 18.3 36.7 23.9 13.0
Gender
Male 46.6 49.1 45.5 45.4 59.1 45.5 36.3 35.5*** 53.0 34.7 51.3 52.0 46.9 31.5
Female 52.7 50.8 53.6 53.9 40.2 54.4 63.7 64.5 46.0 64.6 45.6 48.0 52.8 68.5
M/D/R 0.7 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.0 <0.01 1.0 0.8 3.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Age
19-35 24.0 43.0** 15.9 25.6 4.7 29.0 0.0 33.9*** 18.4 30.8** 22.9 19.9 13.6 52.5
36-64 55.7 44.8 60.4 55.3 75.6 43.0 0.0 65.1 50.4 39.0 42.2 60.2 76.3 34.4
65+ 20.2 12.3 23.7 19.1 19.7 28.0 100.0 1.1 31.2 30.2 34.9 19.9 10.0 13.1
Race / Ethnicity 
Non-Hispanic White 75.8 31.9*** 88.1 68.7 75.4 85.8 100.0 58.3*** 78.6 66.8** 63.5 73.6 81.4 59.2
Non-Hispanic Black 6.7 22.4 4.8 12.0 2.8 1.8 0.0 13.9 7.8 4.1 8.7 8.7 14.9 10.7
Hispanic 11.8 30.6 5.7 13.1 17.8 10.4 0.0 21.8 8.3 28.9 22.4 10.9 2.3 17.0
Asian/Pacific Islander 2.6 10.0 0.7 2.4 1.5 <0.01 0.0 2.6 1.7 <0.01 3.1 2.3 1.4 2.5
Other including M/D/R 3.1 5.1 0.7 3.8 2.4 2.0 0.0 3.4 3.5 0.3 2.3 4.5 <0.01 10.6
Marital Status
Married/Partnered 57.5 48.1*** 61.6 58.8 65.6 41.4 26.9 72.6*** 48.9 27.0*** 47.8 59.8 87.8 27.8
Single, never married 24.4 38.7 18.2 24.2 18.9 30.3 36.3 18.5 27.7 42.0 22.9 21.2 7.2 55.9
Separated/Divorced/ 
Widowed
18.1 13.2 20.1 17.0 14.7 28.3 36. 9.0 23.2 31.0 29.3 19.0 5.0 15.3
M/D/R 0.1 0.0 0.2 <0.01 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Education
Less than high school 4.7 5.7* 4.2 4.2 11.0 2.5 36.8 6.5 3.6 18.6* 11.2 2.0 <0.01 2.9
High school graduate 54.9 62.5 51.6 54.4 55.6 57.9 36.3 53.5 55.7 55.7 67.5 55.1 39.8 63.8
College graduate 24.5 23.4 24.9 25.5 26.7 14.9 26.9 23.6 24.9 11.1 11.2 23.4 40.2 25.4
Graduate degree 15.5 6.9 19.2 15.3 6.4 24.3 0.0 15.5 15.4 14.3 10.0 18.6 20.0 6.6
Other including M/D/R 0.5 1.5 <0.01 0.6 <0.01 0.4 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.0 1.4
Homeownership Status
Homeowner 83.3 70.1* 89.0 82.0 93.9 84.4 63.2 75.9* 87.6 53.3** 77.0 86.1 92.5 86.3
Renter 15.4 29.9 9.2 16.4 6.1 15.7 36.8 22.0 11.6 41.9 23.0 13.9 3.9 13.7
Other including M/D/R 1.3 0.0 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.7 4.8 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties 
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural components; Major Dam-
age - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the home could not be lived in during this time; Minor 
Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable. Destroyed 
and Major Damage have been combined into one category and Minor Damage and Affected have been combined into one category
3   M/D/R:Missing/Don’t Know/Refused
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APPENDIX C TABLE 2. HOUSING DAMAGE BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE CHILDREN IN THE HOME INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+
Housing Damage Level2
No Damage/Affected 79.9 86.6 77.1 84.5 77.4 72.4 79.0 81.1 80.9
Minor 9.1 6.9 10.0 6.6 10.5 6.6 10.8 8.0 12.3
Destroyed/Major 11.0 6.5 12.9 8.9 12.2 21.0 10.2 10.9 6.8
Type of Storm Damage
% who report wind damage 37.8 39.3 37.1 31.0*** 79.0 53.3 43.3* 34.5 46.3 36.3 34.3 39.8
% who report flood damage 29.2 21.0* 32.8 17.6*** 63.4 85.4 29.3 29.2 40.9 28.6 30.0 26.1
% who report mold damage 16.0 17.9 15.2 10.9*** 27.5 44.5 21.9*** 12.6 39.5*** 19.1 10.6 11.6
Utility Loss3 
% who report loss of heat 79.4 77.3 80.3 76.5* 83.8 96.4 82.7 77.4 77.2 62.2 82.3 84.0
% who report loss of hot water 54.9 57.0 54.0 46.2*** 81.0 94.3 51.8 56.6 67.6 51.5 55.9 49.0
% who report loss of electricity 89.1 92.9 87.5 87.9 94.4 93.4 90.3 88.5 87.1 83.0 91.7 88.3
Property Loss
% who report a destroyed vehicle 9.9 5.4 11.8 7.1** 11.5 28.2 10.2 9.7 14.2 5.3 9.4 16.0
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
3   Respondents were asked if their home lost the utility service listed at any point during or just after Sandy.
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APPENDIX C TABLE 3. HOUSING DAMAGE BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE / ETHNICITY








No Damage/Affected 79.9 77.8 81.8 85.0*** 79.2 75.9 77.2 95.5 79.2 93.1 88.7
Minor 9.1 11.5 6.9 1.8 12.3 8.8 9.6 2.5 12.2 6.7 6.0
Destroyed/Major 11.0 10.7 11.3 13.2 8.5 15.3 13.3 2.0 8.6 0.2 5.3
Type of Storm  Damage
% who report wind damage 37.8 37.0 38.8 32.8 42.8 29.7 38.4 35.7 32.8 37.0 30.1
% who report flood damage 29.2 28.9 29.8 22.4 30.5 34.0 31.2 14.5 31.5 39.1 12.5
% who report mold damage 16.0 12.3* 19.5 21.5 13.7 15.7 14.1 19.1 23.5 42.9 1.4
Utility Loss3 
% who report loss of heat 79.4 75.0 83.0 71.5 83.0 78.7 81.2 80.4 76.1 58.5 50.5
% who report loss of hot water 54.9 48.6 59.9 55.4 54.3 55.9 53.7 50.9 64.8 57.9 28.8
% who report loss of electricity 89.1 89.6 88.5 92.4 87.7 89.2 87.1 89.6 95.8 100.0 99.7
Property Loss
% who report a destroyed vehicle 9.9 11.5 8.5 6.3 10.1 13.5 11.7** 1.9 3.3 36.4 3.7
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   Other includes Native American, Multiracial, and other races given by respondents
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
3   Respondents were asked if their home lost the utility service listed at any point during or just after Sandy.
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APPENDIX C TABLE 4. EVACUATION AND DECISION MAKING BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE2 CHILDREN IN THE HOME INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+
Evacuation
% who evacuated 22.3 12.6 26.5 16.6*** 23.4 62.5 23.9 21.4 22.5 23.3 21.5 24.3
% who did not evacuate 77.7 87.4 73.5 83.4 76.6 37.5 76.1 78.6 77.5 76.7 78.5 75.7
% living in mandatory 
evacuation zones
24.2 0.0 34.6 22.3 35.8 28.7 20.6 26.3 18.7 18.8 27.5 28.2
Among those living in mandatory 
evacuation zones, % who evacuated 
28.1 N/A 28.1 22.0* 14.3 77.4 6.8* 37.7 66.0 25.3 28.3 25.3
Reasons for Evacuating3 
Mandatory evacuation order 47.3 <0.01*** 50.4 37.1* 61.8 60.5 35.0 52.7 18.0 35.1 52.9 62.5
Had a safe place to go 44.2 0.0 47.2 39.0 32.4 56.8 30.6 50.2 10.1 29.9 60.2 47.8
Home unsafe 41.0 9.6 43.1 34.9 43.9 50.9 37.4 42.5 4.3* 23.5 49.1 58.6
Thought storm would be bad 29.4 26.3 29.6 27.9 30.3 31.5 45.9 22.1 6.3** 52.6 34.9 12.7
Prior hurricane experience 11.9 0.4*** 12.7 11.6 15.6 11.3 12.0 11.9 4.5 6.9 7.5 21.3
Reasons for Not Evacuating4 
Thought could be safe in home 44.7 46.8 43.7 45.3 47.5 30.3 40.4 47.1 46.3 41.8 48.4 51.2
No mandatory evacuation 29.9 29.1 30.4 29.8 26.9 37.0 36.3* 26.4 35.8 20.0 32.0 34.5
Didn’t think storm would be bad 28.7 29.7 28.2 29.4 28.2 18.3 23.0 31.9 20.6 26.7 29.7 23.1
Stayed home for other hurricanes 
(not Irene)
10.4 2.8** 14.3 9.8 14.6 13.3 7.6 12.0 3.9* 10.9 5.6 24.0
Wouldn’t leave pets 9.1 4.3** 11.5 8.4 15.3 9.5 9.7 8.8 3.1 13.4 9.8 9.7
Concerned about looting 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.5** 0.6 5.5 0.6 0.9 2.9 1.5 0.3 0.7
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
3   All that apply, top five reasons presented
4   All that apply, top five reasons presented
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APPENDIX C TABLE 5. EVACUATION AND DECISION MAKING BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE / ETHNICITY








% who evacuated 22.3 15.5*** 28.7 17.2 23.4 25.6 22.1 32.9 19.9 8.6 8.5
% who did not evacuated 77.7 84.5 71.3 82.8 76.6 74.4 77.9 67.1 80.1 91.4 91.5
% living in mandatory evacuation zones 24.2 20.4*** 27.8 15.1* 24.6 34.1 31.7 3.2 8.7 0.0 1.3
Among those living in mandatory 
evacuation zones, % who evacuated
28.1 18.9* 34.2 15.9 28.2 34.5 27.2 68.0 27.8 N/A 50.1
Reasons for Evacuating2 
Mandatory evacuation order 47.3 51.2 45.1 38.9 42.7 61.0 57.9** 3.3 25.6 0.0 21.4
Had a safe place to go 44.2 40.2 46.3 41.7 37.8 59.1 51.7 9.6 38.0 0.0 0.0
Home unsafe 41.0 43.5 39.7 23.0 42.5 46.2 43.9 33.5 14.1 65.5 82.7
Thought storm would be bad 29.4 29.2 29.6 48.0 24.4 31.2 30.6 19.0 40.9 0.0 0.0
Prior hurricane experience 11.9 6.8 14.6 14.3 7.6 19.9 13.1 4.9 14.0 0.0 0.0
Reasons for Not Evacuating3 
Thought could be safe in home 44.7 48.3 40.0 39.3 45.8 49.0 46.8 40.9 40.1 19.5 67.2
No mandatory evacuation 29.9 29.3 31.2 26.1 31.5 30.7 32.0 15.6 35.6 24.6 12.8
Didn’t think storm would be bad 28.7 30.3 27.5 32.8 27.3 27.2 28.4 10.8 30.1 32.0 54.4
Stayed home for other hurricanes (not Irene) 10.4 12.4 8.5 5.1 12.5 11.7 13.5* 1.1 1.4 18.7 0.0
Wouldn’t leave pets 9.1 7.2 11.1 4.8 10.4 11.2 11.0 0.2 3.1 19.4 11.6
Concerned about looting 0.8 1.2* 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.0
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   Other includes Native American, Multiracial, and other races given by respondents
2   All that apply, top five reasons presented
3   All that apply, top five reasons presented
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APPENDIX C TABLE 6. HOUSING INSTABILITY BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN % UNLESS SPECIFIED)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE2 CHILDREN IN THE HOME INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+
Duration Displaced Among  
Displaced Residents
<1 week 13.8 29.2** 10.6 17.6*** 15.6 0.5 14.7** 13.2 23.2 10.1 13.3 12.5
1-4 weeks 57.7 59.5 57.3 76.7 43.7 7.6 71.3 48.2 46.3 48.5 53.7 62.2
4 weeks – 3 months 9.0 0.2 10.8 0.3 34.2 20.4 4.0 12.4 1.3 11.2 13.3 7.1
> 3 months 19.6 11.2 21.3 5.4 6.5 71.5 10.0 26.2 29.3 30.3 19.7 18.2
Hosting Others
% who report hosting others 
within first 6 months after Sandy
23.0 17.9 25.3 25.1 8.4 20.1 22.5 23.3 13.5 18.0 26.7 22.0
Permanent and Stable Housing
% who report currently living in 
permanent and stable housing3
91.6 90.1 92.2 93.2 85.8 84.4 91.3 91.7 89.6** 82.9 90.6 97.9
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
3   Permanent and Stable Housing is defined as not having to move within the next year 
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APPENDIX C TABLE 7. HOUSING INSTABILITY BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN % UNLESS SPECIFIED)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE / ETHNICITY







Duration of Displacement  
Among Displaced Residents
<1 week 13.8 15.2 13.0 5.8* 14.0 21.6 12.1 15.7 20.7 0.1 53.0
1-4 weeks 57.7 45.9 64.3 79.6 58.0 33.7 55.6 70.1 61.4 99.3 27.4
4 weeks – 3 months 9.0 14.7 5.7 5.9 11.5 5.6 9.9 2.2 9.1 0.6 0.0
> 3 months 19.6 24.2 17.0 8.7 16.5 39.1 22.4 12.0 8.8 0.0 19.6
Hosting Others
% who report hosting others 
within first 6 months after Sandy
23.0 23.0 22.3 25.9 24.2 16.1 23.0 20.6 20.2 35.6 48.9
Permanent and Stable Housing
% who report currently living in 
permanent and stable housing2
91.6 90.7 92.3 91.5 92.0 90.5 93.0 90.8 89.0 66.7 83.9
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
 
1   Other includes Native American, Multiracial, and other races given by respondents
       2   Permanent and Stable Housing is defined as not having to move within the next year
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APPENDIX C TABLE 8. INSURANCE STATUS BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE2 CHILDREN IN THE HOME INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+
Among Homeowners 
% who report having 
homeowner’s insurance
97.6 99.9*** 96.8 99.0* 90.8 94.1 99.7*** 96.5 89.2 95.3 99.7 96.5
Among those with homeown-
er’s insurance, % who  filed a 
claim for damage from Sandy
29.8 28.3 30.3 18.0*** 60.3 90.7 32.6 28.3 28.2 23.9 28.7 33.8
% who report having 
windstorm insurance
17.7 13.4 19.5 10.7*** 43.1 40.9 11.5* 20.8 9.2 22.8 12.9 18.9
Among those with windstorm 
insurance, % who filed a claim 
for damage from Sandy
53.1 65.1 49.4 13.2*** 90.0 87.3 50.0 54.0 30.6 61.3 45.2 37.9
% who report having 
flood insurance
35.1 29.8 37.3 28.8*** 42.7 69.4 36.8 34.1 8.6** 22.7 38.7 46.4
Among those with flood insur-
ance, % who filed a claim for 
damage from Sandy
46.3 15.0* 55.6 21.9*** 87.5 87.9 30.4*** 55.7 62.6 41.9 55.1 37.6
Among Renters
% who report having 
renter’s insurance
37.3 31.2 45.5 38.7 15.8 30.7 36.0 38.3 22.6 30.8 47.5 58.5
Among those with renter’s 
insurance, % who filed a claim 
for damage from Sandy
12.2 3.7 18.7 1.4*** 99.4 99.8 24.3* 1.9 0.0 23.5 7.1 10.4
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
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APPENDIX C TABLE 9. INSURANCE STATUS BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE & ETHNICITY








% who report having homeowner’s 
insurance
97.6 97.2 97.9 99.9 98.1 94.7 97.3 98.3 99.1 100.0 100.0
Among those with homeowner’s 
insurance, % who filed a claim for 
damage from Sandy
29.8 30.7 29.3 18.6 34.4 24.5 29.7 37.8 33.6 0.9 4.3
% who report having 
windstorm insurance
17.7 21.7 14.0 12.1** 12.6 37.6 20.1 4.4 18.7 0.0 9.2
Among those with windstorm 
insurance, % who filed a claim for 
damage from Sandy
53.1 56.9 47.2 66.5 52.5 49.6 50.3 71.0 66.0 N/A 37.0
% who report having 
flood insurance
35.1 35.1 34.3 39.2 35.8 29.1 35.5 50.6 18.9 7.9 46.7
Among those with flood insurance, 
% who filed a claim for 
damage from Sandy
46.3 46.8 47.5 16.9*** 46.9 78.3 53.4*** 6.7 55.7 10.4 11.8
Among Renters
% who report 
having renter’s insurance
37.3 50.4* 16.9 37.5 40.0 21.7 34.9* 34.5 25.8 53.9 99.3
Among those with renter’s insur-
ance, % who filed a claim for 
damage from Sandy
12.2 3.2** 51.1 14.0 9.3 21.5 10.9 0.0 42.8 0.0 0.0
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   Other includes Native American, Multiracial, and other races given by respondents
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APPENDIX C TABLE 10. HOUSING AND OTHER ASSISTANCE NEEDS BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE2 CHILDREN IN THE HOME INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with restoring their home
16.4 10.3* 19.0 6.1*** 40.8 74.2 12.8 18.3 30.2 17.1 16.4 11.6
Among those reporting a problem, % who 
applied for assistance
79.7 86.0 78.2 67.9 83.7 85.3 89.1* 76.2 31.4 88.1 83.5 87.6
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with elevating their home
6.4 0.5*** 8.9 1.4*** 6.0 46.5 5.7 6.7 2.3 5.8 8.6 6.2
Among those reporting a problem, % who 
applied for assistance
83.8 99.8*** 83.4 52.7* 68.6 93.4 66.2* 92.0 95.1 74.8 95.4 64.6
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with cleaning debris
19.2 12.1 22.1 11.7*** 32.6 62.9 17.2 20.3 35.9 17.0 18.7 19.2
Among those reporting a problem, % who 
applied for assistance
41.0 18.3** 46.5 27.5** 39.5 62.7 27.3 47.9 43.0 23.8 49.5 41.6
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with getting housing
2.7 0.6* 3.6 1.0*** 2.5 15.5 3.2 2.4 4.9* 5.6 2.3 1.3
Among those reporting a problem, % who 
applied for assistance
54.7 35.1 56.4 26.5 63.7 60.2 37.5* 73.2 34.2 80.8 45.5 46.7
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with paying their rent/ mortgage
7.4 5.1 8.3 4.2*** 9.3 29.4 10.2 5.6 14.4 3.7 3.3
Among those reporting a problem, % who 
applied for assistance
56.3 59.3 55.5 32.1** 70.6 77.9 51.0 62.1 71.4 32.8 54.3 82.5
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with furnishing their home
6.7 4.3 7.8 2.0*** 10.6 37.8 6.3 7.0 11.4** 13.0 5.8 3.6
Among those reporting a problem, % who 
applied for assistance
47.0 16.0** 54.5 11.2** 36.9 64.2 43.5 48.7 45.4* 25.5 65.1 67.2
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with paying utilities
11.7 14.3 10.7 10.2 16.6 18.8 16.0* 9.2 34.0** 20.3 8.5 3.2
Among those reporting a problem, % who 
applied for assistance
42.2 30.3 48.9 34.0 40.6 71.4 44.8 39.3 39.4 50.3 25.1 78.0
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
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APPENDIX C TABLE 11. HOUSING AND OTHER ASSISTANCE NEEDS BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE & ETHNICITY







% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with restoring their home
16.4 16.3 16.7 10.2 16.7 22.4 18.4 12.8 10.7 0.5 7.4
Among those reporting a problem,  
% who applied for assistance
79.7 81.2 78.3 96.4 75.8 79.2 78.6 91.9 88.0 82.6 45.7
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with elevating their home
6.4 5.9 6.8 1.9* 6.9 9.9 7.4 7.8 0.9 0.0 3.0
Among those reporting a problem,  
% who applied for assistance
83.8 92.6 77.0 71.9 82.0 89.8 91.8*** 25.6 88.4 N/A 100.0
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with cleaning debris
19.2 19.4 19.1 9.1** 19.9 28.6 19.7 15.1 20.9 25.6 8.0
Among those reporting a problem,  
% who applied for assistance
41.0 37.3 44.9 24.2 38.5 51.4 49.3*** 41.6 6.5 0.8 12.8
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with getting housing
2.7 1.4** 3.9 2.2 3.1 2.2 2.7 5.4 1.6 <0.01 0.6
Among those reporting a problem,  
% who applied for assistance
54.7 75.3 46.2 22.1 65.4 62.2 52.9 100.0 39.2 0.0 100.0
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with paying their rent/ mortgage
7.4 7.2 7.6 10.8 6.7 5.2 5.7 13.1 8.9 6.0 19.9
Among those reporting a problem,  
% who applied for assistance
56.3 54.6 57.5 52.0 53.0 77.7 74.4** 16.4 30.5 3.5 99.7
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with furnishing their home
6.7 5.6 7.7 5.5 7.1 7.2 6.1 8.8 10.2 0.2 3.8
Among those reporting a problem,  
% who applied for assistance
47.0 42.0 50.8 27.1 49.5 55.9 60.1** 16.4 20.9 77.3 94.5
% who report having a problem or needing 
assistance with paying utilities
11.7 10.4 13.0 14.2 12.2 7.6 7.3*** 31.4 20.5 0.6 19.7
Among those reporting a problem,  
% who applied for assistance
42.2 30.1 51.2 42.7 39.4 52.3 42.3 38.8 35.6 79.7 99.7
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   Other includes Native American, Multiracial, and other races given by respondents
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APPENDIX C TABLE 12. ECONOMIC BURDEN OF HOUSING BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE2 CHILDREN IN 
THE HOME
INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+
In the 30 days after the storm, % who  
reported difficulty3 paying for…
Housing costs 23.5 26.4 22.3 16.8*** 45.2 52.9 31.0** 19.1 47.6*** 39.1 20.8 5.4
Generators 22.4 20.9 23.1 20.1* 37.1 29.2 32.7* 16.4 16.2 20.6 24.0 25.2
Clearing debris 26.1 23.1 27.3 17.6*** 55.3 65.6 26.7 25.7 37.1 30.3 23.3 23.6
Savings spent on recovery expenses
% who report spending all/quite a bit 12.2 13.8** 11.6 5.7*** 18.7 53.8 15.5* 10.3 27.8*** 13.9 8.7 7.0
% who report spending a moderate amount 12.6 3.1 15.7 9.2 17.3 27.7 11.5 12.3 6.2 14.1 11.6 15.4
   % who report spending a little/none 70.1 72.6 69.0 79.8 54.8 12.3 64.6 73.2 46.2 66.7 76.2 76.9
% who report having no savings 5.7 10.5 3.7 5.2 9.2 6.2 8.4 4.1 19.9 5.3 3.5 0.7
Credit spent on recovery expenses 
% who report spending all/quite a bit 5.9 3.8 6.8 2.8*** 14.5 20.9 8.4* 4.5 20.5** 8.4 3.9 2.8
% who report spending a moderate amount 6.8 5.9 7.2 4.6 10.4 20.1 9.4 5.3 3.9 3.6 8.4 4.4
   % who report spending a little/none 83.4 86.2 82.3 89.1 72.0 51.6 74.8 88.4 62.4 81.2 84.2 92.6
% who report having no credit available 3.9 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.1 7.4 7.5 1.8 13.3 6.8 3.4 0.2
Recovery Programs
% who heard of SHRAP 23.1 12.9** 27.4 20.5** 15.9 47.2 15.0** 27.8 7.5 28.4 28.4 24.3
Among those who heard of SHRAP, 
% who applied for SHRAP 
20.0 20.1 20.0 5.6*** 33.1 62.0 27.7 17.6 37.3 15.6 21.5 18.3
% who applied for 
other government housing recovery funds
16.5 15.8 16.8 7.7*** 21.7 77.6 13.9 18.1 19.5 17.4 18.3 10.0
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
3   Difficulty is measured by respondent answering “somewhat difficult” or “very difficult”
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APPENDIX C TABLE 13. ECONOMIC BURDEN OF HOUSING BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE / ETHNICITY







In the 30 days after the storm, % who  
reported difficulty2 paying for…
Housing costs 23.5 18.3 27.3 36.8*** 22.7 10.1 18.7*** 15.5 52.8 34.5 20.6
Generators 22.4 15.1 28.1 22.9* 26.9 10.0 22.3 18.2 30.5 6.6 22.4
Clearing debris 26.1 24.6 27.6 22.5* 27.4 26.8 26.0** 28.9 33.3 7.0 0.4
Savings spent on recovery expenses
% who report spending all/quite a bit 12.2 10.2 14.1 15.5 13.0 6.4 10.4* 18.9 20.1 4.3 4.1
% who report spending a moderate amount 12.6 14.1 9.1 4.4 13.1 17.7 14.8 3.3 6.3 5.7 0.3
   % who report spending a little/none 70.1 74.0 67.6 70.7 68.5 73.5 70.1 71.2 62.6 83.3 95.6
% who report having no savings 5.7 1.6 9.2 9.4 5.3 2.5 4.8 6.5 11.0 6.7 <0.01
Credit spent on recovery expenses 
% who report spending all/quite a bit 5.9 5.3*** 6.5 3.8 7.2 4.6 4.9 6.6 11.4 9.5 0.4
% who report spending a moderate amount 6.8 2.0 11.0 9.2 7.4 2.6 6.4 9.3 8.8 0.5 3.1
   % who report spending a little/none 83.4 92.0 76.9 78.6 82.4 91.7 86.3 78.6 68.0 90.0 95.6
% who report having no credit available 3.9 0.7 5.6 8.4 3.1 1.2 2.4 5.5 11.8 0.0 0.9
Recovery Programs
% who heard of SHRAP 23.1 24.6 20.8 13.1 26.4 25.1 26.9* 8.5 14.9 18.5 12.7
Among those who heard of SHRAP, 
% who applied for SHRAP 
20.0 24.7 16.2 24.2* 14.7 33.1 20.1*** 1.9 6.4 99.5 38.8
% who applied for 
other government housing recovery funds
16.5 18.1 15.3 16.1 14.6 22.5 17.0 21.3 13.1 15.6 5.7
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   Other includes Native American, Multiracial, and other races given by respondents
2   Difficulty is measured by respondent answering “somewhat difficult” or “very difficult”
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APPENDIX C TABLE 14. COMMUNITY FACTORS BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL REGION1 DAMAGE2 CHILDREN IN THE HOME INCOME
NORTH SOUTH NONE/AFF MINOR MAJOR/DEST YES NO <$20K $20-50K $51-99K $100K+
Sense of Community3 
% with strong sense of 
community membership
70.5 61.1 74.5 69.2 78.2 74.5 69.7 71.0 65.2 63.3 73.4 79.4
% with strong sense of 
emotional connection to community
52.8 39.4* 58.1 51.5 45.4 68.1 52.6 52.9 32.9** 60.1 60.8 47.1
% with strong sense of influence 46.9 43.5 48.4 49.0 18.0 54.0 47.2 46.8 36.9* 33.0 59.7 44.7
% with strong sense of 
trust in governance and social institutions
65.8 57.5 69.1 65.2 61.3 73.5 60.7 68.6 55.0* 71.8 67.5 58.6
Physical Disorder4 
% Frequently worried 12.4 25.8** 6.6 12.9 5.1 14.9 18.6** 8.8 26.6* 11.6 10.6 10.3
% Moderately worried 66.9 62.5 68.8 67.4 65.0 65.1 62.3 69.5 65.5 71.6 71.4 63.1
% Rarely or not worried 20.8 11.7 24.6 19.8 29.9 20.0 19.0 21.7 7.9 16.8 18.0 26.6
Community Environment5
% Frequently worried 
about their neighborhood
2.7 7.5** 0.7 2.2* 0.2 8.1 3.5** 2.2 13.5* 0.8 2.0 2.6
% Moderately worried 
about their neighborhood
53.3 63.5 49.0 54.8 37.1 56.0 59.4 49.8 61.4 55.7 44.0 50.5
% Rarely or not worried 
about their neighborhood
44.0 29.1 50.3 43.0 62.7 35.9 37.1 47.9 25.1 43.5 53.9 46.9
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   North: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Union, Monmouth, Middlesex Counties; South: Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic Counties
2   These categories reflect federal definitions of damage: Destroyed - total loss of structure, structure is not economically feasible to repair, or complete failure to major structural 
components; Major Damage - substantial failure to structural elements of residence (e.g., walls, floors, foundation), or damage that will take more than 30 days to repair and the 
home could not be lived in during this time; Minor Damage - home is damaged and uninhabitable, but may be made habitable in a short period of time with repairs; or Affected - 
some damage to the structure and contents, but still habitable.
3   As measured by the Sense of Community scale
4   Measures include questions regarding drug dealers, having property stolen, walking alone during the day, letting children go outside during the day, letting children go outside at 
night, being robbed, and being murdered. 
5   Measures include questions on litter or trash on sidewalks or streets, graffiti, abandoned cars, vacant or boarded up buildings, houses and yards not kept up, drinking in public, 
gang activity 
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APPENDIX C TABLE 15. COMMUNITY FACTORS BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (COLUMN %)
ALL GENDER AGE RACE / ETHNICITY








% with strong sense of community membership 70.5 71.7 69.1 61.8 72.9 74.0 77.7* 50.0 47.8 65.9 45.1
% with strong sense of emotional connection 52.8 54.0 51.0 21.3*** 59.2 72.3 59.9*** 39.6 31.0 28.3 23.5
% with strong sense of influence 46.9 51.5 43.0 40.4 45.6 59.0 50.6 40.0 25.8 38.8 60.1
% with strong sense of trust in governance and 
social institutions
65.8 66.2 64.8 64.4 61.7 78.5 70.2 46.0 57.6 42.6 77.7
Physical Disorder3 
% Frequently worried 12.4 11.9 13.0 22.4 10.6 5.4 6.5*** 29.1 29.2 34.1 11.9
% Moderately worried 66.9 64.1 69.0 50.8 68.6 81.3 69.2 61.3 52.2 65.7 87.8
% Rarely or not worried 20.8 24.0 18.0 26.8 20.9 13.3 24.3 9.6 18.6 0.2 0.3
Community Environment4 
% Frequently worried about their neighborhood 2.7 3.6 2.0 7.0*** 1.5 0.8 1.6** 1.1 10.9 0.1 0.0
% Moderately worried about their neighborhood 53.3 49.4 57.3 66.4 52.8 39.1 47.3 73.9 60.7 61.0 89.1
% Rarely or not worried about their neighborhood 44.0 47.0 40.7 26.6 45.6 60.1 51.1 25.1 28.4 38.9 10.1
Margins of error for all cells are +/-5 percentage points and based on surveys of 1,000 New Jersey residents, representing 1,047,000 people in the Disaster Footprint. P-values are indi-
cated in the left corner cell of a given section as the following: * ≤ 0.05   ** ≤ 0.01    ***≤0.001 
1   Other includes Native American, Multiracial, and other races given by respondents
2   As measured by the Sense of Community scale
3   Measures include questions regarding drug dealers, having property stolen, walking alone during the day, letting children go outside during the day, letting children go outside at 
night, being robbed, and being murdered.  
4   Measures include questions on litter or trash on sidewalks or streets, graffiti, abandoned cars, vacant or boarded up buildings, houses and yards not kept up, drinking in public, 
gang activity 
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